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Introduction  
  
This paper aims to analyse the evidence for the connections between climate change and 
violent conflict. This is not an easy undertaking. 
  
For many analysts and journalists, these connections have already been proven. In 2007, 
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon announced that the conflict in Darfur was 
the world’s first ‘climate war’1 and popular attention is increasing. According to our research, 
sixteen new books have been listed on Amazon.co.uk since 2009 on the themes of climate 
change, security, and conflict. Yet, connections between climate change and violent conflict 
are—at least for now—largely counterfactual; they have not been proven yet. Connecting 
climate change and conflict depends on how people assume environmental change impacts 
on violent conflict and what people assume inevitably drives violent conflict. These 
underlying assumptions are not always made clear when argument linking violence and 
climate change are presented. 
  
This paper therefore presents two main levels of analysis. The first level reports what 
academic research says is happening about climate change and violent conflict. The second 
level then considers how these studies make their arguments for linking climate change and 
conflict. Together, these two stages of analysis allow us to evaluate the evidence for whether 
climate change will accelerate violent conflict, and the likely ways these connections will 
occur.  
  
The specific questions addressed by this paper are therefore:  
• How will climate change impact upon violent conflict, especially in developing countries? 
• What are the obvious assumptions in how analysts connect climate change and conflict? 
  
These questions consequently allow us to say what evidence exists, but also comment on the 
quality of the evidence by looking at what the alleged evidence aims to prove. Indeed, our 
findings suggest that there are strong disagreements in the literature, which reflect different 
means of explaining the origins of conflict. We argue these models of conflict need to be 
examined critically, with a detailed understanding of all the elements that cause violent 
conflict and its continuation, before believing some of the more catastrophic predictions 
about climate change and conflict.  
 
 
Method 
The research for this paper was conducted using: 
 • A comprehensive search of academic literature, books, newspaper articles and blogs. 
• An evaluation of the nature and quality of evidence presented for linking climate change 
and violent conflict, and a note of how these links were made 
• A critical evaluation of what these writings say about climate change and violent conflict; 
and how different analysts make these links. 
The paper further draws on additional material to provide context for the debate reflected in 
the systematic literature search. Where additional material is cited that is not drawn from the 
systematic literature search, this is marked in the text. To use additional material was 
necessary since the systematic literature mapping as a research method reflected many of the 
                                                        
1
 Ban Ki Moon (2007) ‘A climate culprit in Darfur,’ The Washington Post, 16 June 2007. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061501857.html  
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same problems that we debate in this paper: rather than producing a bibliography that 
comprehensively covers the breadth of issues connected to climate change and violent 
conflict, the results from the literature survey alone would not allow a more in-depth 
understanding of the underlying conceptual issues, as most of the literature fails critically to 
evaluate the models presented, or indeed to engage critically with what kind of evidence is 
used to present the case for the connection between climate change and conflict.  
 
Evaluating Evidence 
Before starting the analysis, this survey thus wanted to acknowledge that evidence’ itself is a 
contested notion. Webster’s dictionary 2  defines ‘evidence’ as ‘something that furnishes 
proof.’ But there are two important questions: proof of what? And, when is something 
proven? 
  
Much writing on climate change and conflict presents some form of evidence. But the 
evidence provided is based on an underlying model of how climate change causes conflict 
that might not be explained much less proven. It is therefore important to consider how 
different authors explain the origin of conflict before looking only at the apparent ‘facts’ they 
present as evidence. The risks of assessing evidence without considering what it represents is 
to get in the habit of assuming a causal link before that link is proven. Another risk is to 
confuse correlation with causation. 
 
The philosopher of science, Nancy Cartwright (2007) described this challenge in a book 
called Hunting Causes and Using Them. In a later paper specifically about ‘evidence’ she 
wrote: 
‘Nothing can count as evidence for anything except relative to a host of 
auxiliary assumptions; and the strength with which a body of evidence 
supports a hypothesis can never be higher than the credibility of these 
auxiliaries’ (Cartwright et al, 2008: 15).3 
  
There is obviously a need to assess the credibility of assumptions that make ‘evidence’ 
appear logical. Sometimes, however, it is also necessary to ask whether evidence is furnished 
to justify assumptions, and whether evidence is also interpreted according to political 
agendas. The Harvard professor, Sheila Jasanoff, has written: 
 
‘When knowledge is uncertain or ambiguous, as is often the case in science 
bearing on policy, facts alone are inadequate to compel a choice. Any 
selection inevitably blends scientific with policy considerations, and 
policymakers accordingly are forced to look beyond science to legitimate their 
preferred reading of the evidence’ (Jasanoff, 1991: 29).4 
  
Simply presenting ‘evidence’, such as data, is therefore insufficient unless the causal model 
and manners of interpretation are also assessed. There is a large academic literature about 
how public policy can influence, and be influenced by, the generation of evidence—and how 
different actors try to make evidence salient or legitimate (e.g. Turner, 2003).5 The case of 
                                                        
2 “evidence” Merriam-Webster.com 2011, http:/www.merriam-webster.com (31 August 2011) 
3
 Cartwright’s work was not found through the literature survey. 
4
 Jasanoff was not found through the literature survey. 
5
 Turner’s work was not part of the literature survey. 
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climate change and conflict seems to be another arena where different analysts present 
evidence for various models of climate change impact, or origins of conflict, that need to be 
assessed alongside whichever evidence is presented.  
 
Database searches 
With above concerns in mind, systematic database searches of peer-reviewed literature dating 
from 2001 to the present produced a list of approximately 40 papers that were most relevant. 
 
The following search terms led to this list: “climate change”, “conflict”, “violen*” and 
“war*”.6  The search strategy combined  “climate change” with one or more of the terms 
‘conflict’, ‘violen*’ and ‘war*’, in order to search for papers which dealt with the claim that 
climate change causes violent conflict.  
 
We narrowed the search by limiting the results to a group of conflict and climate change 
affected states: Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Egypt, 
Libya and Kenya. These countries are the focus of most of the literature on conflict and 
climate change. We also took into account expertise within our team and the potential 
research focus of the JSRP. Table 3 shows the distribution of papers across countries, and 
how they conceptualise reasons for violent conflict. 
 
At the last stage of the systematic search, we asked a specific inclusion question about each 
paper: ‘What is the evidence to support claims that climate change will cause violent conflict, 
with implications for policies and interventions affecting actors at the local (sub-state) level?’ 
Papers that failed to provide information helpful to answering this question were then 
eliminated.  
 
Discussion 
Compared to other evidence papers written by the JSRP, this team’s search was narrower. 
The search terms were fewer in number and the inclusion criteria were reasonably strict. 
 
Firstly, the limited amount of search terms meant that most databases allowed us to search in 
a consistent manner.7 Limiting the search terms to “climate change” as opposed to other 
phrases such as “environmental change” or “global warming” was a conscious decision that 
prevented the search from returning a high number of irrelevant results.  The term “climate 
change” is relatively comprehensive; the term, “global warming” generally predates “climate 
change” and is now generally considered a more popular term. “Climate change” also offers a 
broader range of potential climatic events than temperature rise alone. 
 
One downside of this approach is that some relevant literature that utilised these alternative 
terms and not “climate change” will have been excluded from our search. Our results suggest, 
however, that this was not a problem: for example, there were several papers on pastoralist 
conflicts based on weather patterns.8 One may think simply searching via “climate change” 
                                                        
6
 “*” operates to allow different variations of the ending of a word when searching. Where this was not possible 
(due to search engine limitations) the terms ‘conflict’, ‘violence’ and ‘war’ were used. 
7
 Other JSRP groups undertaking systematic reviews experienced technical difficulties when attempting to insert 
complex search strings into search engines, resulting in rather ad hoc decision-making. . 
8
 See Omolo (2011) and Blackwell (2010) in the Annotated Bibliography. 
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and the other search terms these may have been excluded such articles, but this was not the 
case. 
 
Second, a further concern is that our searches for papers containing the terms “climate 
change” and “conflict” might miss research that shows how people avoid conflict. There is a 
long-standing literature using terms such as ‘institutions’, ‘adaptation,’ and ‘adaptive 
capacity’ that focuses on the means by which communities adjust to resource scarcity or use 
everyday forms of governance that allow people to live with potentially threatening changes. 
We refer to some examples of this literature in our discussion of ‘adaptation’ below. But it is 
worth considering how far the debate about climate change and conflict might be informed 
by papers that assume they are linked—and mention this explicitly in their titles—rather than 
on other papers that focus instead on life without violence. 
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Figure 1: Table of country cases and general conceptualisation of violent conflict 
 
 
 
. 
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Third, this method also focused on sources that specifically mentioned these terms, rather 
than other important conceptual books or writings that have shaped the debate about 
environmental scarcity and conflict. As we discuss below, some of the studies that link 
climate change and conflict in linear ways reflect earlier writings that do not specifically 
focus on climate change alone, but which present a model of conflict that is used by these 
earlier studies (e.g. Diamond, 2005). 
 
And fourthly, focusing on the local level (sub-state) approach that prioritises the end-user 
meant that some macro-level empirical evidence was excluded from this search and therefore 
not assessed. If material failed to engage with what this project has termed ‘end-users’, then 
we did not attempt to assess its relevance. In practice, this meant that papers that dealt 
exclusively with macro-level evidence, such as state-level statistics, without analysing its 
implications for the local level, were excluded. 
 
The impact of this approach is clear when considering the numbers yielded by our search 
strategy. In many cases, whilst a large number of papers remained after our country-level 
inclusion criteria, they were cut down dramatically on the basis of whether they were relevant 
to our research question and end-user focus.  
 
For example, the database ‘Scirus’ produced 621 apparently relevant results, which were then 
manually reduced to ten results on the basis of these inclusion criteria. Among the 212 
potentially relevant articles yielded by the database Columbia International Affairs Online 
(CIAO), there were no articles that were deemed helpful in answering our question. In this 
case, the search results were found to offer much macro-level policy analysis but very little 
engagement on the impact of those policies on end-users. This means that while there may 
well be much more nuanced debate about the link of conflict and climate change in the 
literature, little work has been done to collect local-level empirical data to view these 
arguments from the perspective of the people who are affected by what the researchers 
identify as either climate change or violent conflict. 
 
The benefit of the research method is its attempt to be systematic by trying to avoid 
researcher bias. Yet database searches of this type have limitations too. Broadly speaking, 
such methods have the potential to: neglect grey literature not included in peer-reviewed 
journals; give a false impression of scientific method whilst leaving considerable room for 
researcher subjectivity; exclude certain forms of literature whilst encouraging others; and 
privilege literature that has been filed in a database-friendly way. As discussed above, the 
methods also fails to find papers that engage with broader underlying, yet crucial questions 
about the nature of evidence and how it is used. 
 
Widening the search 
On the basis of such criticisms, it was necessary to supplement any systematic database led 
search with alternative search methods. 
 
Books 
We conducted a literature search on the online site Amazon.co.uk. Given that this site is not 
designed for structured literature searches, we restructured and further simplified our 
methods. This involved using single phrases (e.g. “climate change”) and then manually 
searching for connections with conflict, violence, and warfare and the focus countries via the 
title and abstract (if available). 
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Periodicals 
A periodical search was undertaken on LexisNexis, which produced 69 results that linked 
climate change and conflict. Whilst these articles are not peer-reviewed and therefore are 
unlikely to demonstrate a substantive evidence base, they remain important for helping to 
frame the wider debate on the connection between these phenomena.  
 
Key Journal Searches 
We supplemented the database searches with a search of key journals in the field (see 
Appendices). These were compiled on the basis of the team expert’s knowledge of the field. 
These searches were largely conducted manually, going through key journal publications 
since 2001 and retrieving those papers within our inclusion criteria. In one instance, with the 
journal ‘Nature’, this involved searching in an ad hoc manner in order to best draw out 
relevant papers.9  
 
Discussion of Supplementary Approaches 
These further methods supplemented the original search of academic research described 
above. The results of the Amazon.co.uk search were useful to indicate recent publications on 
climate change and conflict. But these results were not—so far—fully graded because of a 
shortage of time, and because it is unclear whether this modified search strategy was a fair 
representation of books published in this field.  
 
The periodical review was also limited to major newspapers in English. Consequently, many 
reports noted tended to focus on a narrative that prioritises a global North perspective rather 
than an end-user perspective from many Southern conflict-affected regions.  
 
Finally, the search of key journals was targeted to draw out relevant papers, but only 
identified twelve new papers for grading. This small number could imply that the search had 
already been successful—or that the targeting of key journals was still insufficient. 
Nonetheless, it showed there is a limited amount of material in these journals on the 
relationship between climate change and conflict. 
 
Since these additional methods are only supplements to the broader literature search, any 
drawbacks are not particularly problematic. That said, all of the preceding criticisms of our 
own research methods indicate the many difficulties in seeking ‘objectivity’ in the survey. 
Each critique needs to be recognised in order to increase the quality of research going 
forward in the JSRP. A stronger focus on books and newspapers could be crucial given their 
influence in academic and policy environments. 
 
Grading the Literature 
The research team then processed the papers identified by the database searches. First, papers 
were read and summarised. Second, the papers were graded according to the quality and 
nature of their evidence. (See the Appendices for the methods of how annotated 
bibliographies were produced). The purpose of grading was to attempt to produce an 
objective method of assessing evidence. Yet, it should be said at the offset that there is no 
                                                        
9
 As ‘Nature’ is a weekly journal, it made more sense to utilise its search functionality rather than go through it 
manually. This search function only allowed two terms at once, so three separate searches were undertaken: 
“climate change” AND “conflict”, “climate change” AND “war”, “climate change” AND “violence”. 
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possibility of totally eliminating researcher subjectivity in this grading process. Evidence 
itself reflects the underlying assumptions of cause-and-effect adopted by the authors of 
papers. Plus, different researchers will interpret papers and evidence according to their own 
judgment and training. The research team held discussions to agree on some common 
understandings of how to assess evidence but some personal biases remain. 
 
The assessment of evidence followed the same procedure for other evidence papers by the 
JSRP with one addition that related to the underlying model of cause-and-effect relating to 
climate change impacts assumed in each paper. The research team therefore appended the 
following statements, which required grading between the parameters of ‘strongly disagree’ 
to ‘strongly agree’: 
 
The underlying model of what contributes to 
conflict is clearly and transparently described.  
 
The author reviews this underlying model 
critically 
 
The underlying model is used consistently: 
evidence is presented in context of the model 
and predictions of the model are consistently 
used to interpret evidence. 
 
 
This additional layer of analysis allows us to move beyond exactly what is being said (and 
then grading it) and into the question of how certain papers make links between climate 
change and conflict. Particularly within the climate change and conflict debate it is important 
to analyse not only the evidence being used, but exactly what kind of evidence is being 
presented for what underlying assumption of how climate change might cause violent 
conflict. In addition, the team also assessed the consistency of how evidence was used, and 
its role in making the argument of each paper. Indeed, as discussed above, these questions 
about ‘evidence’ are more important in evaluating the connections of climate change and 
violent conflict than simply grading the apparent quality of evidence alone.  
 
  
Analysis 
What is the Evidence? 
  
This section summarises: 
• Different models of conflict for which evidence is presented 
• A description of the type of evidence presented 
• An evaluation of the quality of evidence presented 
  
This section does not summarise all the books, papers, and blogs analysed in our study, but 
reports on the main trends and cites useful examples. Please see the appendices for full 
details of our sources.   The next section on implications considers lessons for understanding 
and governing climate change and conflict. 
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 Different approaches to climate change and conflict 
  
As discussed above, different studies present different evidence about climate change and 
conflict based upon assumptions about the causes of conflict. We found three key categories 
within the literature. 
  
     a) Studies that claimed direct, linear, causal linkages between environmental change, 
scarcity, and violent conflict, usually based on assumptions about population growth 
and how societies respond to competition for resources. These studies have been used 
(if not necessarily proven) mostly in relation to well-known examples of conflict such 
as Darfur and Rwanda, and have been used to generalise about fragile states. Figure 
2, drawn from an additional source by Scheffran, is a good example of how this linear 
relationship between environmental change and violence is often presented.  
 
     b) Studies that emphasise indirect linkages between climate change and conflict. These 
studies do not assume that conflict is an inevitable outcome, but emphasise the role of 
local institutions and behaviors within countries and societies that lessen conflict in 
the event of environmental change and scarcity. These studies often refer to concepts 
such as adaptation and adaptive capacity, and explain in terms of how local 
institutions concerning resources such as cattle might break down and lead to 
activities such as cattle raiding. Some of these studies look at migration as a result of 
climate change for example. An alarmingly simplified depiction of the linkages can 
be seen in Figure 3, as presented by the German Advisory Council on Global Change 
(WBGU) (2007).  (http://www.wbgu.de/en/home/)  
 
c) Studies that highlight the politics of how climate change and conflict are 
themselves presented. These studies are often critical of predictions of extreme 
violence in the first category because these are seen to be misleading and unhelpful 
for countries affected. These studies tend to be written with a more complex 
understanding of what violent conflict is, and how evidence itself can be used 
politically. 
 
These three categories also indicate three broad models of cause-and-effect for 
climate change and conflict that are used by writers to generate or present evidence. 
Table 2 shows a quick summary of these causal models, while Table 1 gives an 
overview of the method of quantification that is used to draw connections between 
climate change and violent conflict.  
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Climate change 
Temperature 
CO2 concentration 
Solar radiation 
Wind, clouds 
Weather extremes 
Ocean currents 
Ice melting 
Sea-level rise 
Natural 
resources 
Soil 
Water 
Ecosystems 
Forest 
Fishery 
Biodiversity 
Oceans/coasts 
Glacier/ice 
Human 
needs 
Water 
Food 
Energy 
Health 
Jobs/income 
Transportation 
Education 
Lifestyle 
Community 
Societal instability 
Demonstrations 
Riots 
Migration 
Poverty 
Lack of legitimacy 
Weak institutions 
Crime/urban violence 
Civil unrest 
Coups d’état 
Armed rebellions 
Terrorism 
Ethnic/racial conflict 
Environmental conflict 
   
Stress Impact Response 
   
Figure 2:  Example of depicting a linear causal relationship between climate change and violence 
Figure 3: Example of depicting linkages between climate change and conflict 
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Table 1: Method of quantification of climate change 
 
The table below summarises what kind of data is used, or in other words how climate change 
is quantified, in the papers found through the systematic literature search. Some papers use 
various methods of quantification.  
 
 
Method of quantification of 
CLIMATE CHANGE  
Papers found in this category # 
papers  
GIS Raleigh and Urdal (2007) 1 
Event-based: sea level change Dankleman et al. (2008;  Federal Ministry 
for Environment (2002); Huser and Larsen 
(2008);  Allouche (2011) 
4 
Event-based: precipitation Kevane and Gray (2008); Brown and 
Crawford (2009);  Dankleman et al. (2008);  
Federal Ministry for Environment (2002);  
Hall (2009);  Huser and Larsen (2008); 
Meier et al. (2007);  Omolo (2010); 
Temesgen (2010);  Theisen (2008); Hendrix 
and Glaser (2007) 
11 
Event-based: land degradation Theisen (2008);  Hendrix and Glaser (2007);  
Dankleman et al. (2008) 
3 
Event-based: temperature  Burke et al. (2009);  Brown and Crawford 
(2009);  Dankleman et al. (2008);  Federal 
Ministry for Environment (2002);  Omolo 
(2010); Tol and Wagner (2008) 
6 
Event-based: extreme weather 
events and sudden disasters  
Allouche (2011); Federal Ministry for 
Environment (2002); Huser and Larsen 
(2008), Meier et al. (2007); Reuveny (2007) 
5 
 
 
Method of quantification of 
CONFLICT  
Papers found in this category # 
papers  
UCDP or similar Raleigh and Urdal (2007); Raleigh (2010); 
Temesgen (2010); Hendrix and Glaser 
(2007) 
4 
Event-based Hendrix and Glaser (2007); Obioha (2008); 
Witensburg and Adano (2009); Meier et al. 
(2007); Reuveny (2007); Theisen (2008); 
Tol and Wagner (2008) 
1 
Survey-based Omolo (2010);  1 
Participatory  Omolo (2010); Temesgen (2010) 2 
 
From these methods of quantification, three broad models of conflict are evident in the 
literature. Please note: 
• The first category included most studies analysed in this paper. 
• It is also possible that the second category might include many more reports that do 
not have the words ‘conflict,’ ‘violence,’ and ‘war’ in the title (such as many writings 
on ‘adaptation’).  
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• It is possible for the second model to overlap with the first and third model. But it is 
not possible for the first and third model to co-exist. 
Table 2: Three broad models of conflict found in the literature 
 
Model: Linear Indirect Critical 
 
 
Underlying 
assumption 
Climate change will 
change rainfall and 
degrade land and 
vegetation in locations 
where societies will use 
violent conflict to 
compete for resources. 
Climate change 
will cause various, 
impacts on 
resources. But 
changes will only 
cause conflict 
where 
opportunistic actors 
break local formal 
and informal 
institutions, and 
sometimes where 
resources are more 
abundant. 
The current public 
debate about climate 
change and conflict 
deliberately avoids 
existing research about 
the nature and causes of 
conflict in order to make 
donors support different 
objectives. A more 
nuanced understanding 
of conflict is needed. 
 
Typical trigger 
of conflict 
When land or water 
become unusable, people 
will claim resources 
elsewhere. 
When land 
becomes unusable, 
and / or when 
opportunities for 
resource 
expropriation arise.  
Conflict is possible, but 
when local adaptive 
capacity is missing, or 
eroded through cost 
cutting. 
 
Typical type of 
conflict 
War, raiding, and in 
some studies, genocide. 
For example, cattle 
raiding during 
relatively wetter 
years. Conflict over 
land rights. 
Indirect forms of 
conflict are possible, but 
the extreme projections 
of violence are 
misleading. 
 
Implication for 
policy 
Climate change must be 
stopped; potential 
conflict must be 
controlled strongly. 
Build adaptive 
capacity, and local 
conflict resolution 
mechanisms.  
Build adaptive capacity 
and locally relevant 
development; do not 
listen to the self-
interested scaremongers. 
 
Alleged 
criticisms from 
other studies 
These studies simplify 
the complexity of 
environmental change; 
the existing and future 
adaptive capacity of 
societies; and the extent 
to which some actors 
want to portray conflict 
in order to legitimise 
their own agendas. 
These studies 
overlook 
projections that 
climate change will 
change resources to 
levels beyond local 
adaptive capacity.  
These studies do not 
take seriously the likely 
impacts of climate 
change on conflict. 
Strong state-led or 
military control is 
reasonable. 
Example 
references 
Diamond (2005), UNEP 
(2007) 
Meier et al (2007) Hartmann (2010) 
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(a) Linear models of conflict 
  
The first category can be called linear models because they assume that environmental 
change leads directly to conflict. Various strands of each causal model were found. 
 
Malthusian stories 
Malthusian approaches are named after the 18th-century British cleric, Thomas Malthus, who 
argued that population growth will lead to sharp population falls as the result of scarcity, 
famine, and conflict. There is a history of political analysis about Africa in this vein. For 
example the US writers, Robert Kaplan (1994) and Paul Ehrlich (1990) have emphasised 
cumulative problems that they argue arise from population growth, ethnic tensions, and weak 
state structures. Such arguments, along with an often-repeated assumption that Africans are 
more prone to have violent conflict, have been widely questioned by other scholars for 
simplifying and stereotyping Africa in this way, often arguing that this is more an issue of 
‘Western’ fears being superimposed onto African issues.10 
  
Some of the most prominent writing on environmental conflict in general is Malthusian (or 
neo-Malthusian) in nature. One of the best-selling books on environment in recent years was 
Collapse: How societies choose to fail or succeed, by Jared Diamond (2005).11 This book 
presented a model of conflict driven by population growth in irresponsible states in 
developing countries.  
Problems of deforestation, water shortage, and soil degradation in the Third 
World foster wars there and drive legal asylum seekers and illegal emigrants 
to the First World from the Third World (498). 
  
He also labelled the links between environmental stress and conflict as ‘transparent:’ 
Countries that are environmentally stressed, overpopulated, or both become at 
risk of getting politically stressed, and of their governments collapsing. When 
people are desperate, undernourished, and without hope, they blame their 
governments, which they see as responsible for or unable to solve their 
problems. They try to emigrate at any cost. They fight each other over land. 
They kill each other. They start civil wars. They figure that they have nothing 
to lose, so they become terrorists, or they support or tolerate terrorism. The 
results of these transparent connections are genocides…civil wars or 
revolutions… the collapse of central government… and overwhelming poverty 
(516). 
  
It should be made clear that Diamond’s statements here are controversial, and challenged by 
various other studies we refer to. But this study is a useful starting point because it 
demonstrates the statement of a model of conflict as an assumed fact.  An example of how 
this model of conflict assumes an unchallenged link between climate change and conflict is 
depicted graphically can be found in the example below from a press release of the 
University of Berkeley (2009), which makes a stark prediction without referring to any data 
at all to back up this claim. 
 
                                                        
10
 See, for example, Mbembe 2001; Mkandawire 2002; Whitehead, 2004; Wainaina, 2005 Dominelli 2007; 
Mamdani, 2009; Schomerus, 2010. 
11
 Diamond is not included in the bibliography compiled for this evidence paper, presumably because his lack of 
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Figure 4: Example of prediction of climate change conflict (Burke et al, 200912) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2009/11/23_africa_climate_change.shtml 
 
Diamond’s book presents evidence for the ‘transparent’ connection between environmental 
change and conflict by presenting narrative histories of how various societies have 
(allegedly) managed population growth or forest cover over time (Easter Island and Rwanda 
are examples of societies that have led to societal collapse). But these histories are based on 
the application of universal cause-and-effect statements between forest loss and soil erosion; 
the impacts of these on agricultural productivity; and the resulting creation of conflict and 
collapse that do not reflect other scientific discussions of these processes. They furthermore 
ignore examples of local coping mechanisms, which can be particularly strong conflict 
mitigators in a so-called weak state.  
  
In turn, these statements refer to a wider discussion about scientific explanation in 
environmental change that does not only refer to the impacts of climate change. ‘Erosion,’ for 
example, is a highly varied problem, and it need not be the only cause of agricultural 
problems in developing countries. Yet, many scientists have become used to assuming it is, in 
part because the normal means of measuring is called the ‘Universal Soil Loss Equation,’ 
which in turn was based upon the experience of the USA in the Dust Bowl in the 1930s that 
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 Maclay, K. (2009) ‘Climate change could boost incidence of civil war in Africa, study finds,’ 
UCBerkeleyNews, 23 November 2009. This website was not found in the literature search, but the paper it 
reports (Burke et al. 2009) was included. 
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are not necessarily transferable to other locations. Similarly, the same discussions also show 
that forest cover is not necessarily the key cause of erosion, and that many locations that have 
successfully converted tree-covered land into agriculture have prospered.  
  
Books such as Collapse make arguments, and present evidence for these arguments, on the 
basis of causal assumptions that are widely questionable and have been criticised by other 
studies both before and after its publication (e.g. Peluso and Watts, 2001).13  Yet, these 
underlying causal models are not questioned in the book, nor discussed within popular 
audiences. The uncertainty about the underlying causal model is therefore important for 
assessing the quality of the ‘evidence’ presented for the connections between environmental 
change and conflict. 
 
A similar influential study was the report by the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP, 2007) that the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon used to claim that Darfur is the 
world’s first ‘climate war’. 14  This report also adopts a very Malthusian tone, but also 
provides a variety of knowledge sources, and points to the problems of pre-existing political 
tensions and that contribute to crisis. For this reason, this report by UNEP could also be 
included in the second category of ‘indirect’ links between climate change and conflict. But 
we include it in this initial category because the report clearly indicates that environmental 
change (including climate change) is the key trigger for conflict. 
 
The report writes: 
‘UNEP’s analysis shows that there is a very strong link between land 
degradation, desertification and conflict in Darfur. Northern Darfur—where 
exponential population growth and related environmental stress have created the 
conditions for conflicts to be triggered and sustained by political, tribal or ethnic 
diﬀerences—can be considered a tragic example of the social breakdown that can 
result from ecological collapse. Long-term peace in the region will not be 
possible unless these underlying and closely linked environmental and livelihood 
issues are resolved’ (95). 
 
It also states that deserts in Sudan and the Sahel have spread southwards by an average of 
100km over the past four decades, linked to an explosion of livestock during this period from 
some 27 million to 135 million on fragile soils.  This report also cites climate models that 
predict long-term declines in agricultural productivity for the Sahel (UNEP, 2007: 61): 
 
And:   
‘The scale of historical climate change as recorded in Northern Darfur is almost 
unprecedented: the reduction in rainfall has turned millions of hectares of already 
marginal semi-desert grazing land into desert. The impact of climate change is 
considered to be directly related to the conflict in the region, as desertification has 
added significantly to the stress on the livelihoods of pastoralist societies, forcing 
them to move south to find pasture’ (60). 
 
This report by UNEP provides much information about rapid environmental change. Yet, 
UNEP’s use of terms such as desertification has been criticised in the past for overstating 
physical change as a cause of social problems, rather than other factors such as social 
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 This article was not found through the systematic literature search. 
14
 This report was not found through the systematic literature search. 
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vulnerability to drought, and indeed the scientific uncertainty about the origins of drought 
and movements in vegetation on desert margins (e.g. Thomas and Middleton, 1994—
although this critique too has its critics). As we note in section [c] below, there are also 
studies that show the long-term nature of the drought in the Sahel that implies degradation is 
not necessarily the result of humans alone, and that the physical causes of change are still 
contested (e.g. Dai et al, 2004).15 
 
This report, nonetheless, is an in-depth description of crisis in Sudan, which argues for 
adaptive capacity to strengthen livelihood options in order to mitigate conflict. There is, 
however, an assumption that environmental changes are largely the result of human actions; 
that climate change has caused both degradation and conflict; and a general lack of 
discussion of alternative explanations of conflict. As we discuss in section [c] below, some 
critics have argued these assumptions underplay the responsibility of other actors, such as 
militias and the Sudanese state, in conflict (e.g. Kevane and Gray, 2008). 
 
We shall return to this book in section [c] concerning criticisms of linkages between climate 
change and conflict. But it is also worth noting that the direct—and catastrophic—linkages of 
climate change and conflict are frequently adopted in some other recent books, and especially 
blogs on climate change. For example, Tropic of chaos: Climate change and the new 
geography of violence (Parenti, 2011), or the lengthily-titled, Boiling point: How politicians, 
big oil and coal, journalists, and activists have fueled the climate crisis—and what we can do 
to avert disaster by Ross Gelbspan (2004) tend to emphasise the sensational. These works 
include a variety of overtly populist and academic texts. It is important to ask how far the risk 
of worst-case scenarios might zoom in on only a handful of simple possible solutions and 
hide discussion of less volatile outcomes. Another question is whether authors are motivated 
by sensationalism, and possible impacts on book sales. Gelbspan—who himself has a career 
in journalism—suggests as much when he writes: 
‘the climate issue is riven with conflict at every level—and conflict is, if 
nothing else, the lifeblood of journalism. ... To sidestep this story is to deprive 
oneself of an extraordinary professional challenge’ (Gelbspan, 2004: 85). 
  
Assessing ‘evidence’ for the connections between climate change and conflict therefore 
needs to consider why, and on what grounds, writers make different claims. 
  
We discuss more on how to interpret evidence in the section, ‘Implications’ below. But it is 
also worth noting at this stage that most of the studies coming from military sources also tend 
to adopt the perspective that climate change will lead inevitably to violent conflict. The 
implications of this are a securitisation of climate change, as well as a focus on solutions to 
the violence ‘proven’ to be cause by climate change through the means of the military. For 
example, one study by Hall (2009) from the Advanced Military Studies program in Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, argued that the reduction of water levels in Lake Chad will increase 
regional conflict. According to the author at some point the effects of population growth, 
migration into the system, climate change and refugees will ‘destabilise the system.’ Again, 
this long work is speculative, based on a causal model that resource scarcity will be 
responded to by violent conflict. This paper also presents a good example of how conflict 
narratives are shaped: Hall argues a linear progression of events and effect, ending with a 
relatively simple prediction of conflict that legitimises a relatively simple solution to be 
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 Both Thomas and Middleton as well as Dai are additional sources not found through the systematic search. 
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found in the water levels of Lake Chad. We will return to the theme of presenting conflict as 
a linear, primarily security, issue with simple, primarily military, solutions later in this paper.  
  
  
Regression analysis 
Many studies using regression analysis have also adopted a causal model that assumes 
environmental change will lead directly to conflict or failing governance. These studies are 
different to the Malthusian stories above because they seek to investigate historic associations 
of various indicators of environmental quality and political outcomes, using samples of 
several statistics, rather than narratives about case studies. However, these studies pay little 
attention to historical adaptation strategies and, crucially, historical political environments 
that might have influenced political outcomes. They also make very broad assumptions about 
what aspects of environmental quality might lead to conflict. 
  
For example, Hauge and Ellingsen (1998), in a large-n study found that land degradation, 
freshwater scarcity, population density and deforestation increase the risk of civil conflict. In 
a style of research broadly similar to Paul Collier’s regression analysis of natural resources 
exports and conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Collier, 2000), this paper used secondary, 
national-scale statistics of factors such as forest cover, soil degradation, visible forms of 
conflict, and the type of democracy within each country.16  
  
This study was then re-assessed by Theissen in 2008, who instead argued that the statistics 
did not support the conclusions made in 1998 and that conflict was more attributable to 
poverty and dysfunctional social and political institutions. Yet, both papers assume it is 
feasible to measure environmental degradation and quality through indicators such as forest 
cover, and using national statistics. The point is that these kinds of studies analyse the alleged 
causes of conflict by using indicators of things they consider to be problematic. But the 
choice of these causal factors is controversial in themselves. Indeed, forest cover, in itself, 
has been linked to increases in conflict when it is composed of tree plantations (Gerber, 
2010). Plus successful human settlement has often followed the conversion of forest in both 
developed and developing countries. Assuming that decrease in forest cover, by itself, is a 
legitimate cause of conflict is an assumption that needs to be justified much more than 
currently done by these kinds of papers. 
  
Moreover, these papers fail to use information at a more local scale, and do not assess how 
affected people actually experience these factors. In a conflict area, the local manifestation of 
the ‘type of democracy’ tends to look rather different than to categories that seem fitting at 
the state level.  
 
There are various other studies that consider the connections between diverse variables and 
violent conflict. Hendrix and Glaser (2007), for example, develop a model of conflict based 
upon projected trends in land degradation, the continued suitability of climate for Eurasian 
agriculture, and freshwater resources per capita mapped against an indicator of how far 
rainfall is projected to vary in coming years. A great deal of empirical data is presented to 
good effect, attempting to demonstrate (contrary to conventional wisdom) that variability in 
climate patterns in sub-Saharan Africa will not dramatically increase in the coming years. 
However, the authors’ arguments are premised on the assumption that such variability would 
necessarily increase conflict, an assumption that they do not critically challenge. 
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 Collier and Collier and Hoeffler were not found through the systematic literature search.  
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Raleigh and Urdal (2007) also use GIS data and information at the sub-national scale. They 
argue that population growth and density are associated with increased risk of conflict; while 
land degradation and water scarcity have a very minor effect. Lower levels of GDP were the 
most important predictor of armed conflict. This study is valuable because it shows that 
regression analysis can be done at the sub-national level. It emphasises a different outcome to 
the regression studies above by arguing that conflict is not a necessary outcome of climate 
change, and by suggesting that adaptive capacity (indicated here by wealth) is more 
important. 
  
  
Climate models 
A similar linear model has been adopted under various studies that predict violent conflict on 
the basis of climate models. For example, Burke et al (2008) used a quantitative analysis of 
historical temperature patterns in order to predict changes in the incidence of civil war in 
Africa under future climate change. They combine their estimated historical response of 
conflict to climate with climate projections from 20 general circulation models that have 
contributed to the World Climate Research Program’s Coupled Model Intercomparison 
Project phase 3. The authors’ conclusions are dramatic—arguing that the dangers of 
temperature increases far outweigh any potentially offsetting effects such as ‘strong 
economic growth and continued democratisation.’ 
 
Similarly, the UNEP (2007: 61) report referred to above also reports on pre-existing UNEP 
research on climate models, based on a ‘baseline climate’ rainfall and temperature data 
between 1961 and 1990, and then various modeled scenarios for 2030-2060. The model 
predicted a 0.5 to 1.5°C rise in average annual temperature and an approximate five percent 
decline in rainfall. Using these figures to predict crop yields in sorghum, millet, and gum 
Arabic led to ‘potentially disastrous’ declines of up to 70 percent in some districts. 
 
There is a long-standing debate, however, about how far these kinds of modeled predictions 
will lead to human impacts in the terms they describe. The main challenge is in predicting 
how far human adaptive capacity can respond to these challenges, or whether projected 
physical changes will imply direct and parallel impacts in current levels of economic activity 
(Reynolds et al, 2007). Much historic analysis reveals that measuring climatic change alone is 
rarely a good indicator of how markets and people respond to these changes (e.g. Adams and 
Mortimore, 1999).17 On the other hand, modelers claim that the rapidity of climate change 
will mean that current forms of adaptation are unlikely to work successfully. Working out 
how to adapt, however, needs information about how societies and different actors actually 
see and respond to scarcity, which projections based on climate models fail to do. 
  
A more recent set of research considers the role of El Niño18 on conflict.19 Hsiang et al 
(2011) analysed the relationship of El Niño and war, concluding that El Niño doubles the risk 
of civil wars across 90 affected tropical countries. They also claim that El Niño helps account 
for a fifth of world conflicts between 1950 and 2004. The authors—who are from the 
Columbia University Earth Institute headed by Jeff Sachs—claimed a correlation of El Niño 
                                                        
17
 Neither Reynolds nor Adams and Mortimore were found through the systematic search.  
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 El Niño is the name given to the periodic warming of the tropical Pacific Ocean every three to seven years 
that has various connected impacts such as droughts and temperature changes across the globe. The related 
phenomenon, La Niña, originates from relative cooling of the eastern Pacific. La Niña often follows El Niño.   
19
 None of the material on El Niño cited here was found through the systematic literature search. 
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and civil conflicts that killed more than 25 people per year, using a dataset of 175 countries 
and 234 conflicts. They argued that countries affected by El Niño have a six percent chance 
of civil war breaking out, and a three percent chance during La Niña. (As a control, countries 
without either La Niña or El Niño stand a two percent chance of war). The authors claim that, 
overall, El Niño has played a role in between 21-30 percent of civil wars during this period. 
 
One of the authors was reported as saying: 
 
‘No one should take this to say that climate is our fate. Rather, this is 
compelling evidence that it has a measurable influence on how much people 
fight overall… It is not the only factor—you have to consider politics, 
economics, all kinds of other things’ (Mark Cane, 2011).20 
 
Yet, this study does not consider those other things, and instead is based on correlation of 
atmospheric events, and measurements of conflicts (within a national scale) that killed more 
than 25 people. Do these statistics prove causality, or are the climatic and conflict events only 
associated—and the indicator of conflict (25 deaths, nationally, per year) too simple? Again, 
this kind of study shows the importance of assessing the underlying model of causality as 
well as ‘evidence’ by itself. It is worth noting the lead author, in the same article, reportedly 
claimed they still did not know why climate feeds conflict, adding: 
 
‘If you have social inequality, people are poor, and there are underlying 
tensions, it seems that climate can deliver the knockout punch’ (Hsiang, 2011). 
 
Accordingly, is their research evidence of how El Niño causes conflict—or that ‘inequality, 
poverty, and underlying tensions’ cause conflict? 
 
Studies such as these present their findings as evidence of a linear link between atmospheric 
changes and localised, socio-political changes in diverse contexts on the ground. Yet, they 
fail to engage in depth with historical political conditions. Moreover, the implication of these 
studies is that conflicts can be avoided if climate can be managed. As the second and third 
section of our review of climate studies show, many other analysts argue that a more useful 
approach is to address local vulnerability and governance. Some analysts also propose that it 
is important to question why so much research avoids discussing adaptive practices and local 
politics. (See section [b] below). 
  
  
(b) Indirect models of conflict 
  
The second broad category of studies assumes that climate change can be associated 
indirectly with conflict. These studies focus less on direct linkages between climate change 
and violent conflict but instead emphasise social practices (sometimes called institutions) and 
social vulnerability (sometimes called adaptive capacity) as mediating factors. In turn, these 
studies of climate change tend to propose solutions that do not just limit the potential physical 
impacts of climate change but also include building local adaptive capacity and conflict 
resolution. 
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Some of these studies are equally pessimistic to the Malthusian approaches listed above. 
Some, however, argue that local practices can mediate conflict, and as a consequence, the 
most important contribution of climate change policy is to help build those practices, rather 
than assume that climate change will lead inevitably to conflict and deduct from that that the 
only way to mitigate or prevent conflict is through environmental measures.  
  
There is also a methodological difficulty here. As we noted in the discussion on 
methodology, our study focuses on books and papers with the words ‘conflict’, ’violence,’ 
and ‘war’ in the titles. These sources tend to assume that conflict is a likely outcome from 
climate change. There are, of course, many other books and papers that talk instead about 
‘adaptation’ (or adaptive capacity) where the focus of study is how people live without 
conflict. Our study, therefore, might present a bias by not acknowledging the large literature 
about climate change impacts that do not mention conflict and security explicitly. Some of 
these studies on adaptation and the possibility to experience research scarcity without conflict 
are also referred to in section [c] below on studies that critique links between climate change 
and conflict. 
  
  
Resource capture and ecological marginalisation 
The majority of literature on institutional controls on conflict discussed the negative impacts 
of climate change on competition for resources, and how these impacted on existing political 
divisions. These studies can look similar to, and have the same pessimism as, the Malthusian 
studies above. But we are treating them as different because they tend to explain 
environmental degradation in terms of what it means for different people, rather than 
assuming environmental change to be a visible and uniformly affective cause of change. 
  
Much of the literature on the institutional conflicts associated with climate change overlaps 
with other writings about conflict and ‘natural resources’—where resources are defined as 
tradable and transportable commodities such as logs and gemstones (sometimes this 
distinction is referred to as lootable and unlootable resources). In some senses there were also 
direct similarities when papers argued that climate change would lead to an increase in 
stealing cattle. A common influence in the writings is the work of Thomas Homer-Dixon in 
the 1990s (e.g. Homer-Dixon, 1999), who used the concepts of resource capture and 
ecological marginalisation to refer to, respectively, the political opportunities for control from 
elites arising from resource scarcity, and the retreat of people from resource-scarce areas into 
fragile ecosystems, thus creating further environmental challenges.21 
 
In a similar vein, Obioha (2008) critically analyses the Homer-Dixon/Malthusian link 
between climate change-conflict in northeastern Nigeria. This study finds that resource 
scarcity exacerbates group identity conflicts in the region, particularly among those who 
practice animal husbandry, which contributes to the indigeneity-based conflicts occurring 
throughout Nigeria. 
  
Raleigh (2010) analyses an overview of African Sahel and argues that political and economic 
marginalisation/vulnerability is a critical control on whether conflict will occur. This paper, 
however, is based on existing databases in the same style of the regression analyses above, 
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which in turn carry assumptions about the causal models of conflict (and the nature of 
environmental degradation). 
  
But Meier et al (2007) provide a paper that challenges this perspective. This study looked at 
the motivations of people involved in conflict in the border regions of Ethiopia, Kenya, and 
Uganda—and thus takes into account local political dynamics—rather than statistical 
associations between measurements of conflict and environmental degradation. This study 
argued that raids on cattle are more likely to occur when vegetation is more abundant, and 
when raiding groups are more engaged in ‘aggravating behavior’. It also argues that cattle 
raids are low when reciprocal exchanges and peace initiatives between groups are low. This 
study provides an explanation for cattle raiding that is based on local explanations and 
motivations for raids, rather than on a linear association of environmental change and 
scarcity. This type of study therefore provides some evidence for the concept of resource 
capture. But it does not support the concept of ecological marginalisation on the grounds that 
‘ecology’ itself is not the driving force for conflict. 
  
  
Exacerbating existing risks 
Various studies emphasise the cumulative effect of climate change on other political tensions, 
or as a ‘threat multiplier’ (e.g. Brown and Crawford, 2009; Scheffran, 2011).22 Blackwell 
(2010) for example, asks if climate change is ‘the straw that will break the camel’s back’ 
concerning pastoral communities in East Africa. He argues that climate change is the 
‘underlying link’ between poverty and conflict among pastoralists in the Greater Horn of 
Africa. But this paper does not present in-depth evidence for this claim, and is again based on 
the assumption that added stresses will cause conflict. Plus, there is no discussion of how 
cattle raiding has existed historically as a persistent (and possibly permanent) phenomenon 
among pastoralists in this area. 
  
Some papers, however, rely on more specific analysis of the institutions (or coping 
mechanisms) used by pastoral communities in the Horn of Africa, and the specific 
vulnerability of cattle again for raiding. Temestgen (2010) argues that environmental 
deterioration coupled with other social/political/economic factors ‘tremendously increase’ the 
likelihood of conflict in the Horn of Africa. This paper, instead, uses qualitative evidence and 
some fieldwork among pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia to 
argue that traditional institutions (which serve as coping mechanisms in times of 
environmental scarcity) are weakened due to policies of ethnic federalism, which disrupt 
reciprocal grazing arrangements. This weakening in turn increases the likelihood of 
violence/cattle raiding in pastoralist communities. 
 
Witensburg and Adano (2009) uses its own dataset of resource scarcity, archives, and 
interviews. This paper supports the finding of Meier et al (2007) above, which claims that 
cattle raiding in northern Kenya is more likely in wetter years. Wetter years will experience 
more vegetation for cattle to eat, and possibly allow raiders more security in their own food 
supply, which will allow more time and opportunity to engage in raiding. The paper notes the 
lack of a statistical relationship between conflict and resource scarcity, but cites the 
importance of human agency in conflict, and the importance of political opportunities in 
determining the incidence of raids and that raids are used a way to express resentment. It uses 
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‘violent deaths’ as a proxy for conflict. These indicators, of course, carry simplifications for 
how ‘conflict’ is defined. 
 
Cumulative impacts on conflict can also come from migration. Reuveny (2007) argues that 
climate change will cause people in developing countries to migrate, and may cause conflict 
in receiving areas. It notes that this conflict occurs in the presence of resource competition, 
ethnic tension, distrust, and socio-economic/cultural fault lines. This model applies to general 
migration as well, which is accelerated by climate change. This article acknowledges that it 
does not find a causal link between climate change and conflict, and notes that its sample is 
likely too small to be generalised.   
  
  
Social differentiation and vulnerability 
Much existing work in environmental policy has highlighted the role of social vulnerability in 
making environmental change hazardous. Some analysts have argued that specific social 
groups—such as women and children—are essentially vulnerable because of historic social 
practices. Others have said that it is more important to see the circumstances when these 
groups become vulnerable rather than see vulnerability within social categories alone.  
  
Some studies of climate change and conflict have emphasised social categories. Dankelman 
et al (2008) present a gendered analysis of how climate change impacts on human security, 
and whether adequate scope exists for women to participate in improved human security in a 
scenario of changing climate. This study, however, uses some quite categorical terms. For 
example, it says that ‘Men are more overconfident, thinking that they can predict and handle 
the future themselves, whereas women are more willing to adapt their strategies and 
behavior.’ Again, this kind of analysis of climate change and conflict presents ‘evidence’ for 
its argument. But its argument is based on a causal model that can be questioned. 
Furthermore, such emphasis on social categories implies certain solutions. 
  
Omolo (2011) also discusses gender implications of climate change and conflict, but in a less 
essentialist way. This article proceeds from the assumption that climate change is occurring, 
and that it creates droughts and floods in northern Kenya. It argues that these changes are 
likely to increase the drivers of conflict in this area and increase the economic vulnerability 
of women. This article notes that pastoralist groups in this area have developed a complex set 
of coping strategies to deal with the changes and notes that mobility is an especially 
importance component of this. The ability of women to be mobile is therefore an important 
determinant of their ability to reduce their own risk from climate change, and any conflict 
arising from climate change. But, as with many papers above, this paper also makes many 
assumptions about how climate change will happen, and how societies respond. It also does 
not account for what happens in times of abundance, such as floods or heavy rains which the 
author notes might also result from climate change. 
  
  
Fragile states 
The role of institutions in mediating (or failing to mediate) climate change has been 
emphasised in some literature within the discipline of International Relations. Climate change 
is represented as an added stressor to states that are already ‘fragile’ or unstable, especially 
concerning climate events that might affect disaffected populations. For example, Smith 
(2007) argues that there is an association between terrorism and climate change in Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Bangladesh, even if this pattern cannot (yet) be demonstrated 
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statistically. The suggested mechanism is that climate change may create weak states, reduce 
state capacity, and create ungoverned spaces, which are easily exploitable by political 
extremists. This paper relies on existing literature to make its claims. 
The paper does belong to a broader literature that works with the assumption of linear 
progressions and predictable outcomes of levels of state capacity. It uncritically assumes that 
a weak state creates ungoverned spaces and that ‘ungoverned’ spaces are a lawless breeding 
ground for political violence and terrorism (Mills and Herbst, 2007; Busby, 2007;  Clunan, 
and Trinkunas, 2010). Not only is this assumption in need of interrogating, as Clunan and 
Trinkunas do in their edited collection, it is also symptomatic of broad-brush conclusions that 
often form the basis of the link between climate change and conflict.  
A good paper to make the counter point - although one with its own questionable conclusions 
- is Temestgen (2010). Temestgen, as discussed above, sees the reason for local violence 
amongst pastoralists in Ethiopia’s federalism and thus argues that the strong Ethiopian state 
has undermined the very same local coping mechanisms that Smith dismisses as being able to 
govern ‘ungoverned spaces.’ Temestgen further concludes that his findings are applicable 
across the whole of Africa, which is hard to verify in a paper that draws on one case.  
Pitting the two papers against each other serves to illustrate that no certainty exists whether a 
weak or a strong state serves as the better mitigator of conflict or whether climate change 
weakens or strengthens the state.  
  
 (c) Studies critiquing the links of climate change and conflict 
  
The third broad category of studies focuses on criticising links between climate change and 
conflict. These studies are not denying climate change, nor suggesting that its effects will not 
be problematic. Rather, this body of work argues that there is a need to understand violent 
conflict in more complex ways than simply triggered by environmental or climate change, 
and consequently there is a need to look for other causes of social vulnerability and conflict. 
  
Importantly, this section of work also proposes that the current concern about climate change 
and conflict can be damaging to development assistance, and to developing countries because 
it might misdirect assistance to military or security forces, rather than assist poorer people in 
developing capacities to help themselves. However, there seems to be limited research into 
the climate consequences of directing assistance to the military, for example into illegal 
logging by armies, with references often made in passing (Schomerus, 2007; Palmer, not 
dated). Military actors are also large users of greenhouse gases (Schoch, 2011).23 
  
  
Adaptive behaviours that lessen conflict 
Much research within human ecology has highlighted the ability of societies to adapt to 
resource scarcity. These studies are not explicitly included in this review, because they 
usually do not refer explicitly to ‘conflict’, ‘violence’ or ‘war’. Indeed, our study has found 
that papers that do use these terms usually repeat the view that conflict is an inevitable 
outcome of climate change.  
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It is worth noting that the widespread debate about adaptation to climate change, and 
different forms of adaptation, are about ways of responding to climate change that do not lead 
to conflict (e.g. see classic work by Peluso and Watts, 2001).24 Adaptation, in turn, is a form 
of the debate about ‘institutions’ and ‘common property regimes’ in environmental behavior. 
In some ways, the ‘conflict’ debate is occurring in parallel—without connection—to 
discussions about adaptation. 
  
There are, however, some explicit studies that have referred to how adaptive changes have 
avoided conflict (e.g. see as cited in Hartmann, 2010: 237). This kind of research seems 
based in local fieldwork-based studies involving end-users rather than analysis based on 
modeling or assumptions about how societies will respond. Witsenburg and Roba (2007), for 
example, found that there was less social violence in northern Kenya during times of drought 
and water scarcity than during periods of relatively higher rainfall. This study supports the 
findings of work above that suggested cattle raiding increased when vegetation was relatively 
more abundant. This study also pointed to the role of local common property regimes. 
Another study in northern Senegal from 1998–2002 found that drought-related migration 
among pastoralists also encouraged better and more responsive institutions, or shared 
behavior concerning adaptation to scarcity (Juul et al, 2003). There are many other studies 
like this.25 
  
  
Concerns about de-emphasising other causes of crisis 
Another theme of research that questions the link of climate change and conflict focuses 
instead on how far this debate depoliticises and de-emphasises other, important, causes of 
conflict. These papers agree that conflict occurs. But they worry that blaming it on climate 
change misses the point. 
  
For example, Huser and Larsen (2008) from the Norwegian Refugee Council argue that 
climate change is likely to contribute to an increase in forced migration in locations where 
people’s livelihoods are badly affected by salinisation, desiccation, etc. These authors argue, 
however, that the climate change and environmental factor is one among several root causes 
of conflict and forced migration. In particular, they criticise the phrases ‘environmental’ or 
‘climate’ refugees because these terms imply a mono-causality rarely found in human reality. 
Figure 2 is another good example of the implied causal change between environmental 
factors and mass-migration. 
  
Kevane and Gray (2008) more explicitly argue against the representation of the Darfur 
conflict as a ‘climate war’. They overtly criticise the United Nations and the economist Jeff 
Sachs for arguing that Darfur’s crisis can be explained in terms of climate change, and 
especially reductions in rainfall. They point out that commentators who suggest a climate 
change explanation for the Darfur conflict rarely present data to validate their claims, and 
instead rely on the assumption that Darfur is part of the Sahel, an area where rainfall has been 
low, variable, and in decline. Indeed, various analysts disagree about how to interpret the 
long-standing drought in the Sahel, and whether it is because of human influences. The 
authors argue that discussing rainfall as a cause of conflict reduces attention to questions of 
responsibility by the Sudanese government, or means of enhancing local adaptive capacity.  
 
                                                        
24
 Peluso and Watts are an additional source. 
25
 None of the studies cited in this paragraph were found through the systematic literature search.  
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The paper implies but does not explicitly state the lack of historical awareness in the climate 
change/conflict debate. It is a recurring phenomenon that climate change is treated as a very 
recent development, creating previously inexperienced conditions that create previously 
unseen types of conflict. This is of course not the case: Darfur has seen severe periods of 
drought before; an extensive literature exists on the depoliticised misinterpretation of such 
drought patterns as the cause of famine and violence (e.g. Dai et al, 2004) Much of this 
literature is ignored in the current focus on Darfur as a climate war. 
  
  
Concerns about weakening appropriate forms of development assistance 
And some of the most explicit criticisms argue that the discussion of climate change and 
conflict serves a political purpose to undermine certain forms of development assistance, and 
instead empower other political agendas. These arguments refer to the role of the military in 
emphasising climate change and conflict; or the overall implications of writers such as Jared 
Diamond (2005) that managing environmental problems in developing countries is inherently 
linked to unstable regimes and military intervention.  Indeed, Diamond writes: 
 
People in the Third World can now, intentionally or unintentionally, send us their 
own bad things: their diseases like AIDS, SARS, cholera, and West Nile fever… 
unstoppable numbers of legal and illegal immigrants… terrorists; and other 
consequences of their Third World problems (518) …as a result of those 
problems [they] are also creating problems for us rich First World counties, 
which may end up having to provide foreign aid for them… or may decide to 
provide them with military assistance to deal with rebellions and terrorists, or 
even have to send in our own troops (2005: 516). 
 
Indeed, as Diamond implies, military intervention in conflict areas has come to represent the 
interests of the ‘intervener’, as much as those being ‘intervened’. Finnemore (2003) argues 
that intervention must be coupled with legitimacy, which is generally achieved by coupling it 
with social dimensions beyond the use of force. This social dimension can often be found in 
the creating of internationally accepted standards. These are most commonly standards that 
draw on a human rights or institution-building agenda, both of which require a stronger state 
to be implemented. It follows from her argument that such international standards could 
include climate change policies, particularly as these are often presented as a security issue.  
  
Betsy Hartmann (2010) is a key critic of this kind militarisation and securitisation of climate 
change policy. She writes: 
 
Raising the specter of climate refugees and climate conflict obscures the real 
battle lines in the climate policy arena. …We do not need the military to fight 
these battles. Instead they should take place in public, democratic, civilian 
spaces at all levels of politics and governance. Those who continue playing the 
climate refugee and conflict card are raising the stakes unnecessarily and 
threatening to militarize not only climate policy, but also development aid 
(Hartmann, 2010: 242).26 
  
Hartmann (2010) does not propose that climate change policy is unnecessary, or that the risk 
of conflict is not there. But she worries that the current emphasis on conflict as immanent and 
                                                        
26
 Hartman was not found through the systematic literature search.  
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inevitable empowers a political agenda that represents international development assistance 
as a question of military control to be undertaken by military actors. Instead, development 
assistance can build adaptive capacity and local means of addressing conflict that are more 
useful for affected people. 
  
  
Implications: Assessing the evidence provided to link climate change and conflict 
  
The preceding section outlined what is presented as evidence for the links between climate 
change and conflict in the literature we surveyed. In this section, we review the implications 
for how to assess evidence for the relationship of climate change and conflict. 
 
This section carries three points: 
• An assessment of how to consider evidence alongside causal models. 
• A summary of what the evidence in the papers we analysed looked like. 
• A discussion of the apparent trend suggesting analysts and journalists are 
‘bandwagoning’ on the theme of climate change and conflict. 
 
 
Evidence and causal models  
Does the evidence presented in these studies ‘furnish proof’ that climate change causes 
conflict? The obvious conclusion from our summary above is that different analysts have 
presented different proof to argue varying viewpoints. Some of the strongest claims—e.g. 
Jared Diamond’s statement that there are ‘transparent linkages’ between population growth, 
environmental degradation, and conflict in Rwanda—are actually presented on the basis of 
assumed causal linkages; similar changes have not led to analogous outcomes in other 
locations. 
  
Similarly, the studies that emphasise ‘large-n’ samples, using regression analysis, also reduce 
the apparent causes of conflict to criteria of environmental quality that assumes that variables 
such as forest cover are linear indicators of land degradation, and linked to rates of violence. 
Both assumptions seem extreme, and frequently, statistics are presented at the national scale 
that avoids local drivers of conflict.  
 
Assessing the ‘quality’ of evidence is therefore a challenge. Sometimes reports claim to have 
good quality evidence because they refer to important and distressing crises such as Darfur 
and Rwanda—or use large numbers of statistics that look analytical to the untrained eye. But 
if these forms of evidence refer to a causal model of conflict that is unproven or simplistic, 
then this so-called evidence is of dubious value. 
 
Evidence therefore needs to be assessed simultaneously with the underlying model of 
explanation. Yet, the underlying model is sometimes widely assumed to be true, even where 
there is much research and public debate to indicate that they are highly flawed. This 
phenomenon is not new. Some analysts in development and public policy have used terms 
such as ‘narratives’ or ‘mother statements,’ as a way to indicate that these assumptions are 
often repeated widely. The political scientist, Emery Roe, for example, wrote:  
 
Development narratives tell scenarios not so much about what should happen as 
about what will happen according to their tellers—if the events or positions are 
carried out as described. (Roe, 1991:288). 
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Roe further suggested in a more recent piece of work that policies are best understood by 
looking at the narratives they present, rather than assuming that policies are based on 
evidence (Roe, 2006). This approach is helpful when looking at the narratives that underpin 
current policy approaches to climate change and conflict.  
 
‘Environmental’ narratives have been widely discussed in previous research outside of 
debates about climate change. In the Himalayas, for example, Thompson et al (1986) noted 
that there was a widespread belief that population growth was leading to rapid deforestation, 
erosion, and crisis. Yet, on closer inspection, the actual experience of risk varied according to 
the vulnerability and adaptive practices of hill farmers; and the published estimates of 
deforestation in the region between 1965 and 1981, including from many ostensibly credible 
sources, varied by a factor of 67, even excluding apparent typing errors. Fairhead and Leach 
(1996) have also argued that much forest policy in Guinea in west Africa is based on the 
assumption that smallholder agriculturalists are deforesting land; when in fact villagers have 
for years created ‘forest islands’ for their own protection and resource use, and where the 
distinction between open savannah and closed forest is always varying. There are other 
examples (Forsyth and Walker, 2008).27 
 
The debate about environmental narratives argues there is a need to think about why 
assumptions remain in place despite the availability of research and experience to refute 
them. The very same issue arises when examining the most common conflict narratives, 
which often perpetuate the same simplified versions of the causes of conflict, despite a range 
of more nuanced evidence. This is a broad challenge: sometimes these beliefs are populist 
summaries that are repeated in newspapers, TV programs, and everyday discussion. Conflict 
actors and other interest groups are often interested in pursuing a particular ‘conflict 
narrative’, Darfur being a prominent example of how a conflict narrative was reshaped by a 
US-interest group (Lanz, 2009). 
 
 But beyond normative and ideological reasons for certain environmental and conflict 
narratives there are also links to how research and evidence gathering are undertaken. For 
example, in one academic paper about ‘how to do’ environmental assessments, the authors 
wrote about the various challenges of increasing participation as a way to reframe or change 
the objective of research. These authors openly admitted that: 
 
Expanding participation does not necessarily benefit the assessment process—
particularly in the short term. It can reduce the assessment’s quality, make the 
assessment logistically unmanageable and/or increase the difficulty of reaching 
consensus (Farrell et al, 2001:330). 
 
And, it is unsurprising that evidence—and the causal models that justify data as ‘evidence’—
change if the social participation of assessments and research change. Nancy Cartwright, the 
philosopher of science, has written: 
 
Things look very different when we survey the whole problem for the users’ 
point of view than when we look for the point of view of the scientist charged 
with producing sound results to offer up as evidence (Cartwright, 2008: 30) 
 
                                                        
27
 None of the studies mentioned in this paragraph were found through the systematic literature search.  
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Clearly, many studies of climate change and conflict have presented evidence for these 
connections, but these are based on, either, assumptions about how they are linked; or 
empirical methods that are based on atmospheric or economic modeling that do not take into 
account local perspectives of the problems or adaptive behavior. These approaches to 
knowledge gathering are openly criticised in social sciences,28 and yet reports on linear, 
assumed, linkages between atmospheric changes and local violence are printed and cited 
widely. 
 
Assessing the quality of evidence for climate change and violent conflict should therefore 
draw reference to: 
• Not just the data presented, but the plausibility of and evidence for the underlying 
causal model, 
• How far research considers local adaptive responses based on historical context rather 
than just assumptions about how people respond, 
• An assessment of which policies and actors are strengthened by different knowledge 
claims. 
 
 
Summary of evidence analysed in this paper 
 
Is evidence a bandwagon for climate change and conflict? 
Our analysis has shown that many papers and books are emerging on the theme of 
climate change and conflict—and that many of the most eye-catching publications 
refer to a linear and urgent connection between forthcoming climate change and 
immanent conflict. It seems reasonable to ask if discussions of climate change and 
violence are now a fad; a process of discussing a problem in the hope of gaining 
attention, and possibly funds? 
 
‘Bandwagoning’ refers to the process of joining in a topic of popular debate in order 
to strengthen one’s own position, even if that position is not directly relevant to the 
debate. We do not want to suggest that the problems of climate change and conflict 
are unimportant. But it is worth noting that some analysts are now asking if climate 
change is becoming a bandwagon for various other policy concerns (Jinnah, 2011). 
Indeed, analysts in international politics have argued for years that states and societies 
securitise issues to make them appear more urgent (Buzan et al, 1998; Duffield, 2001; 
Fierke, 2007). 
 
Detraz, for example, has written: 
 
[the] environmental activists Wangari Maathai suggested that Northern 
states might not act on climate change unless they are convinced of the 
severity of its impacts. She said…”climate change is an issue of security 
both locally and internationally,” This is a powerful example of the logic 
                                                        
28
 For example, one academic from the University of South Carolina has openly attacked the publication of the work 
connecting El Niño to violence, asking how it got through peer review. 
http://www.edwardrcarr.com/opentheechochamber/2011/08/25/conflict-and-el-nino-how-did-this-get-through-peer-review/   
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of using security language to shake Northern countries into action on 
climate change. (Detraz, 2011: 116). 
 
There is no doubt that representing climate change in terms of war and violence 
catches attention in the media, and makes for interesting discussion. Our research 
highlighted that the academic papers on the relationship of El Niño to historic civil 
wars achieved a high level of discussion in the press, and that many bloggers and 
activists used this report to strengthen their own arguments. We do not present 
analysis of these non-academic writings in this current paper. But it is worth noting 
that many popular discussions do not question the underlying models of causality, and 
sometimes use the evidence presented as ‘proof.’  
 
We would suggest there are obvious problems of allowing populism, or 
bandwagoning, to influence climate change policy too far. There is a need to discuss 
whether the causal models (and implied solutions) of many sensational approaches to 
climate change and conflict are appropriate. And adopting these models also implies 
that certain policies and political actors are appropriate solutions. There is a need to 
pause and think about who benefits from these approaches; and whether the models 
and proposed policies will help. According to one analyst at a UK-based think tank: 
 
Efforts to link climate change with violent conflict may not be based on 
solid evidence, but they have certainly captured the attention of 
governments. They have played a vital role in raising the much-needed 
awareness of climate change as an issue that deserves global action. But 
at what cost? Focusing on climate change as a security threat alone risks 
devolving humanitarian responsibilities to the military, ignoring key 
challenges and losing sight of those climate-vulnerable communities that 
stand most in need of protection (Schoch, 2011: 1). 
 
 
 
Conclusion: What is the role of climate change in violent conflict? 
  
This paper has sought to answer the question: What is the evidence for climate change 
causing violent conflict? Our short answer is: So far, not much. 
 
Of course, as this paper shows, there are many books, papers, and articles that have been 
published that claim to present evidence for these links. But, many of these studies are based 
on assumptions and causal models about how atmospheric changes result in violent conflict 
that are unexplored, unproven, or too simple. As a result, the evidence that is presented here 
is difficult to see as ‘furnishing proof’ that climate change is an active cause of violent 
conflict. 
 
What does this mean for understanding the impacts of climate change, and how to govern 
conflict? We make three conclusions and suggestions. 
 
First, the difficulty of establishing evidence for connecting climate change and conflict 
should not been seen as implying there is no problem; no connection; or no need for action. 
According to all reputable predictions, climate change will produce changes in rainfall, 
temperature, and weather events that will take place in locations with histories of violent 
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conflict, and where there are large numbers of people who have been vulnerable to famine 
and persecution in the past. It is likely that significant climatic changes will have impacts in 
these contexts. The challenge lies in understanding how impacts will occur, and then using 
that knowledge to develop adequate responses. 
 
So far, however, the most common overt discussions of climate change and conflict have 
assumed that it is necessary to establish a causal link of the two by looking at very reduced 
definitions of violent conflict (such as wars that kill more than 25 people a year), or of 
environmental quality (such as forest cover) that do not indicate much complexity in how 
people achieve livelihoods or experience resource scarcity. Many other studies also simply 
assume that atmospheric changes will cause conflict simply by claiming that violence is a 
likely outcome. Others still adopt very linear assumptions that changes in resources will 
necessarily cause violence such as riots, crime, ethnic conflict, and terrorism without placing 
these projections in the context of local practices, history, or concerns (e.g. Scheffran, 2011) 
 
It is therefore a source of concern that so many studies about climate change and conflict 
seek to present it in terms of a mono-causal or uniform association. Instead, there is a need 
for a more variable and less uniform model of causality. Some of the studies we reviewed 
seemed to converge on the finding that cattle raiding—as one form of violence—was 
positively correlated with climate, but only when wetter years produced more vegetation, 
healthier cattle, and presumably healthier people (e.g. Meier et al, 2007). This causal model 
of violence is based upon the opportunistic seizure of resources in zones where there are 
widespread social divisions. It is not the only explanation of how climate change and conflict 
are connected. But it is more plausible as one of various potential impacts than a macro 
mono-causal explanation that asserts a linear association between conflict and climate. More 
research about how and why changes in climate give occasions of conflict are needed in order 
to present a more complex linkage of climate change and conflict, Indeed, this example 
challenges the popular image of African crisis because it portrays violence as an opportunity 
for enrichment, rather than an inevitable result of drought. 
 
Our first conclusion, therefore, is that there is a need for a more nuanced explanation of the 
linkages between climate change and conflict, including a more nuanced examination of how 
both climate change and conflict are conceptualised, that reflects local motivations and 
responses more than a single mono-causal association. 
 
Second, there is a need to be aware of who benefits from the production of ‘evidence.’ This is 
a wide-reaching challenge. Some journalists—such as Ross Gelbspan, cited above—have 
somewhat openly discussed that writing about climate change in sensational terms is a 
professional opportunity. It is also clear that institutes and academics will achieve more 
visibility if they write about potential immanent disaster. Plus social-science critics have 
alleged that the military or authoritarian states are seeking to strengthen their own legitimacy 
by discussing climate change as a high-stakes question of national security (e.g. Hartmann, 
2010).  
 
Pre-existing research in environmental and public policy has argued that underlying 
assumptions (or narratives) will remain in policy debates—even though research has 
questioned or refined them—because it is in the interests of certain actors to repeat them. 
There is a need to ask who benefits from arguing different scenarios of climate change and 
conflict? Which organisations, governments, or other actors stand to gain by predicting 
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violence or proposing solutions? And how do these analyses impede debate about alternative 
policy proposals? 
 
And third, there is a need to understand more about what causes conflict, and what social 
practices exist in zones or times that have no violence. Our paper has shown that most 
publications mentioning ‘climate,’ ‘war,’ ‘violence,’ and ‘conflict’ allege linear connections 
between climatic changes and violence, but do not engage very closely with pre-existing 
research that has focused on the origins of conflict alone. 
 
At the same time, it is worth considering how adaptive capacity, or conflict resolution, are the 
norms that need to be studied rather than focusing on violence as the subject of study. For 
example, there are long-standing examples of adaptation to scarcity that are not labelled 
‘conflict’ or ‘security.’ Finding out about how people live with scarcity and unpredictability 
might be more useful for locally-relevant governance of climate change than trying to prove 
that individuals will respond with violence to climate change.  
 
This paper has sought to contribute to the debate about climate change and conflict by 
critically reviewing current claims about evidence—and by questioning whether it counts as 
evidence. We conclude by saying that these matters are too important to be decided by 
sensationalist and crude discussions about violence and climate. Claims about climate change 
and conflict need to be treated critically. While climate change is likely to have various 
impacts on human behaviors and resources, these need to be understood with reference to 
local context and practice rather than on the basis of bold claims based on assumptions. 
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Bronkhorst, S. (2011) ‘Addressing Climate-related Conflict: Human Security and 
lessons from the Southern Sahelian Belt of Sudan’,  Conflict Trends, Issue 2 
 
Bronkhorst applies a widened notion of human security to an assessment of climate conflict 
between pastoralists and farmers in Southern Sudan. Moreover, the author argues that 
Traditional Conflict Resolution (TCR) mechanisms have a strong potential to decrease 
climate conflicts. The study takes a rather uncritical approach to linking climate chnage and 
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conflict and does not acknowledge the limited evidence for such claims. The author 
meantions her research but does not further elaborate on methodology or results, it is thus not 
clear on what evidence her conclusions are based. 
 
Brumfiel, G., & Knight, J. (2003). ‘Climate of conflict: in the shadow of war’, 
International Alert. 
 
This paper aims to assess the ‘consequences of the consequences’ of climate change. It 
concludes that conflict-sensitive climate change policies can actively promote peacebuilding, 
and that climate-proof peacebuilding and development policies can be effective climate 
change adaptation policies. 
This paper clearly utilises a great depth of research to demonstrate the ‘double-headed 
problem’ of climate change and violent conflict. Whilst it correctly highlights that a great 
deal more local-level research is needed, it simultaneously utilises existing research rather 
uncritically to make a number of recommendations (such as the 2007 IPCC report.) 
Furthermore, the paper recommends linking peacebuilding and climate adaptation, but fails to 
critically interrogate such terms. 
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Buhaug, H. (2010) ‘Climate not to blame for African civil wars. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 107(38), p.16477-16482. 
Available at: http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1005739107. 
 
This article is a reply to Burke et al. (2009) and questions their conclusion that climate 
change and conflict are directly linked. Instead Buhaug argues that climate variability does 
not have a direct impact on short-term risks of civil war. However, the study does not 
consider indirect or long-term impacts of climate change  on increased conflict risks. 
Moreover, Buhaug concedes that more rapid climate change in the future may potentially 
lead to more civil wars. The study is based on empirical datasets but unlike earlier studies 
takes a more nuanced view on definitions of civil war and other inclusion criteria such as 
time and place.  Thus Buhaug is able to problematise methodological approaches in 
quantitative studies on climate wars and suggests improvements. 
Coder:       CV 
Score data quality:     2 
Score quality analysis:    3.5 
Total score:      5.5 
 
Quantity of data/information used:  10%-50% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Other 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  Theoretical 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  No significant new analysis / theoretical 
insight 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Agree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Strongly disagree 
Underlying model used consistently  Agree 
 41 
 
 
Buhaug, H., Hegre, H., Strand, H. (2010) ‘Sensitivity Analysis of Climate Variability 
and Civil War’, PRIO Paper, November 2010 
 
This study is build on Buhaug (2010) and adds to the critique of Burke et al.'s (2009) claims 
for a causality between global warming and increased cicil war. As in Buhaug (2010) the 
authors concede that there may indeed be a link between climate change and other forms of 
conflict. However, they stress that further research is needed in order to analyse social 
impacts of climate change further. 
 
Burke, M. B., Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., Dykema, J. a, & Lobell, D. B. (2009). ‘Warming 
increases the risk of civil war in Africa’. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 106(49), 20670-4. doi:10.1073/pnas.0907998106 
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The authors utilise a quantitative analysis of historical temperature patterns in order to predict 
changes in the incidence of civil war under future climate change. They combine their 
estimated historical response of conflict to climate with climate projections from 20 general 
circulation models that have contributed to the World Climate Research Program’s Coupled 
Model Intercomparison Project phase 3. 
The authors proposed causal link between temperature rises and violent conflict is rooted in a 
quantitative analysis which removes the political context of such conflict from view. The 
authors’ conclusions are dramatic – it is argued that the dangers of temperature increases far 
outweigh any potentially offsetting effects such as ‘strong economic growth and continued 
democratization’. Given that they have not undertaken a political analysis they are not well 
placed to make such an assessment. The research methods these conclusions are based on are 
transparently demonstrated but move too easily from a correlative explanation into causality. 
 
 
Busby, Joshua, White, Kaiba, Smith, Todd (2010) ‘Mapping Climate Change and 
Security in North Africa’ Climate and Energy Papers, the German Marshall Fund of the 
USA 
 
This study maps the relationship between climate change and security in North Africa (here 
North Africa also includes Mali, Niger, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa). Using a variety of 
empirical datatsets and indicators the authors consider four issue areas: conflict, migration, 
terrorism, and humanitarian disasters. the study finds that a securitisation of climate change is 
occurring in the policy sector which is not based on academic evidence. By combining 
climate and socio-political indicators the authors make a sound and nuanced argument that 
shows that the countries will be most vulnerable to any potential security issues are not those 
most physically threatened by climate change but those with socio-economic vulnerabilities. 
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Blackwell, PJ (2010), ‘East Africa's Pastoralist Emergency: is climate change the straw 
that breaks the camel's back?’, Third World Quarterly, 31:8, 1321-1338 
 
This paper argues that the Turkana are dependent on an environment that is no longer 
sustainable for the traditional form of pastoralism. On this basis, the author contends that 
these communities need to move beyond survival on food aid and towards fundamental 
livelihood strategy changes, rooted in an understanding of the effects of climate change. 
This paper assumes that climate change is the ‘underlying link’ between poverty and conflict 
among pastoralists in the Greater Horn of Africa, yet fails to provide any in-depth evidence 
for this claim. The author relies heavily on cherry-picked reports on the issue and fails to 
critically interrogate these assumptions. The paper's methodology is entirely unclear. Whilst 
reference is made to interviews, information on the possible breadth and depth of these is not 
forthcoming, rendering the author’s conclusions debatable.  
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Brown, O., & Crawford, A. (2009). ‘Climate Change and Security in Africa’, Foreign 
Affairs, (March) 
 
This desk-report attempts to assess the extent to which climate change may affect violent 
conflict in African states. It contends that climate change is best seen as a ‘threat multiplier’ 
that intensifies existing problems and vulnerabilities – any conflicts that arise from such 
threats depend more upon governments and governance rather than environmental change. 
The authors appear careful not to engage in environmental determinism by making clear that 
their discussions are based on potential scenarios, not forecasts. Yet the bulk of this paper 
still attempts to establish a strong causal link between climate change and conflict. This 
results in a rather contradictory paper; whilst accepting the limitations of current theories 
proposing a causal link, it then proceeds to argue for exactly such links. Additionally, this 
paper tends to rely heavily on a few sources – for example Boko et al. (2007). Since this is a 
desk-report, it contributes little new insight to the climate change and conflict debate. 
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Dankelman, I., Alam, K., Ahmed, W. B., Gueye, Y. D., Fatema, N., & Mensah-Kutin, R. 
(2008). ‘Gender , Climate Change and Human Security Lessons from Bangladesh , 
Ghana and Senegal’ Prepared for ELIAMEP. Sustainable Development, (May). 
Retrieved from 
http://www.gdnonline.org/resources/WEDO_Gender_CC_Human_Security.pdf 
 
This study presents a  gendered analysis of how climate change impacts on human security. 
Italso assesses whether adequate scope exists for women to participate in improved human 
security in a scenario of changing climate.  This study is deeply uncritical in its use of current 
research. It also underpins its gendered analysis with some rather sweeping claims. For 
example, that ‘Men are more overconfident, thinking that they can predict and handle the 
future themselves, whereas women are more willing to adapt their strategies and behavior.’ 
This paper includes some useful case studies yet fails to explore these in greater detail whilst 
also providing no data on the extent of interviews undertaken. Finally, this paper eventually 
fails to explore why exactly ‘greater inclusion of women and inclusion of a gender-specific 
approach in climate change adaptation and decision-making may reverse the inequitable 
distribution of climate change impacts.’ 
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Detraz, N., 2011. ‘Threats or Vulnerabilities? Assessing the Link between Climate 
Change and Security’, Global Environmental Politics, 11(3), p.104-120 
 
Using the Copenhagen's School concept of 'securitization', Detraz argues that appyling an 
environmental security framework to climate change can be beneficial for climate change. 
Even though he highlights some issues with this approach, for example, a focus on state 
instead of human security or an overt militarization of climate change issues, the author is 
generally in favour of linking climate change and security. Detraz claims to provide a 'meta-
analysis' of the current debate (i.e. An extended  literature review), however, this analyis is 
rather uncritical of the evidence used in any of the papers discussed. 
 
Coder:       CV 
Score data quality:     1.83 
Score quality analysis:    2.5 
Total score:      4.5 
 
Quantity of data/information used:  10%-50% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Qualitative, interview-based Other 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  No significant new data / information 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  No significant new analysis / theoretical 
insight 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  NA  
Underlying model reviewed critically  NA 
Underlying model used consistently  NA 
Coder:       AH 
Score data quality:      
Score quality analysis:     
Total score:       
 
Quantity of data/information used:  Less than 10% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Theoretical 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  Theoretical 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  NA 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Strongly disagree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Strongly disagree 
Underlying model used consistently  Strongly disagree 
 
 47 
 
Federal Ministry for the Environment (2002) ‘Climate change and conflict: Can climate 
change impacts increase conflict potentials? What is the relevance of this issue for the 
international process on climate change?’,  Environmental Policy 
 
This paper is in 3 parts. Part 1 is a description of a conference on climate change and conflict. 
Part 2 is a paper by Brauch on ‘Climate Change, Environmental Stress and Conflict’. Part 3 is 
a paper by Oberthur et al. on ‘Climate Change and Conflict Prevention’. Only parts 2 and 3 
require assessment on the basis of evidence presented – the marks given in this grading sheet 
reflect an average across the 2 relevant parts. 
Part 2: This report analyses the conflict dimension of societal and political implications of 
climate change in interaction with 5 other ‘primarily nature induced’ and ‘human induced’ 
factors. It is argued that a combination of these factors can contribute to ‘environmental 
stress’, which can then can lead to a variety of (largely negative) ‘probable outcomes’ – 
including violent conflicts.  
The author relies on his initial analysis of climate change being part of a ‘survival hexagon’, 
which is utilised to good effect in each of the case studies. This paper critically interrogates 
the work of the IPCC and attempts to highlight areas where further research is needed. 
However, like much climate change literature, this piece at first highlights how any 
‘predictions’ will be purely speculative, but then goes on to outline a series of events based 
on such speculation which governments must mitigate against. That said, this paper retains a 
strong breadth and depth, drawing on existing literature to make a reasonable convincing set 
of suggestions for research, sensibly focusing on the non-military nature of potential climate 
change problems. 
Part 3: The paper attempts to assess the importance of the increasing literature on the link 
between climate change and conflict for international discussions and negotiations on climate 
change issues. It is argued the rationale for attempting to mitigate the impacts of climate 
change is strengthened by the effect it can have (amongst other factors) in generating conflict. 
This, it is argued, should also push the notion of adaptation to the forefront of the 
international agenda. 
This paper does not prevent empirical data since it is an analysis of international climate 
policy debates. Again, this paper contends that there is not enough scientific evidence to 
make a causal link between climate change and conflict, but that there is sufficient 
knowledge about the link between climate change and conflict prevention in order to form a 
sound basis for integrating such ideas into international policies. 
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Hall, E. (2009). ‘Conflict for Resources : Water in the Lake Chad Basin’, School of 
Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth , Kansas 
 
This monograph discusses the propensity for conflict surrounding the diminishing water in 
Lake Chad. The paper uses a comparative case study to determine the extent that states face 
conflict over scarce natural resources. The author concludes that the reduction of water levels 
in Lake Chad will increase regional conflict. According to the author, at some point, the 
effects of population growth, migration into the system, climate change and refugees will 
‘destabilize the system’. 
This author’s analysis is rooted in an understanding of conflict and its drivers derived from 
the work of Collier, B.C Smith and Michael Klare, and fails to critically engage with any of 
them. Similarly, the relationship between environmental scarcities and inter/intra state 
conflict is uncritically drawn from Thomas Homer-Dixon’s work. Given the authors 
assumptions about the causal link between environmental stresses and conflict, his 
conclusions are unsurprising. This paper only draws on existing literature, and therefore is 
not a particularly useful paper. 
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Hendrix, C., & Glaser, S. (2007). ‘Trends and triggers: Climate, climate change and 
civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa’,  Political Geography, 26(6), 695-715. 
doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.006 
 
This article addresses the relationship between climate and the onset of civil conflict from 
two perspectives. The first is a model of conflict onset in which the variables of interest are 
measures of (a) trends: land degradation, climate suitability for Eurasian agriculture, and 
freshwater resources per capita and (b) triggers: interannual variability in rainfall. The second 
perspective involves assessing the outlook for the future based on an analysis of simulated 
changes in precipitation means and variability. 
A great deal of empirical data is presented to good effect, attempting to demonstrate (contrary 
to conventional wisdom) that variability in climate patterns in sub-Saharan Africa will not 
dramatically increase in the coming years. However, the authors arguments are premised on 
the questionable assumption that such variability would necessarily increase conflict, an 
assumption which they do not critically challenge. That said, a positive point is that their 
presentation of quantitative analysis does not lead them to ignore the political dimensions of 
resource scarcity. 
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Huser, A., & Larsen, S. S. (2008) ‘Future floods of refugees: A comment on climate 
change, conflict and forced migration’,  Norwegian Refugee Council, April  
 
This paper argues that climate change impacts are likely to contribute to an increase in forced 
migration. It is contended, however, that the climate change and environmental factor is one 
among several root causes of conflict and forced migration. 
This paper is a well-balanced discussion of the climate change and conflict debate, which 
tends to critically appraise common assertions. In particular, there is a strong criticism of the 
phrases ‘environmental’ or ‘climate’ refugee (which often is argued will lead to violent 
conflict) since these terms imply a mono-causality rarely found in human reality. However, 
this paper relies heavily on existing literature and therefore overall contributes little new 
information or insight to the debate. 
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Kevane, M., & Gray, L. (2008). ‘Darfur: rainfall and conflict’,  Environmental Research 
Letters, 3(3), 034006. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/3/3/034006 
 
This paper argues that careful attention should be paid to examining the rainfall explanation 
of the emergence of violence in Darfur. It is contended that commentators suggesting a 
climate change explanation for the Darfur conflict rarely present data to validate their claims, 
instead relying on a general understanding that Darfur is part of the Sahel, an area where 
rainfall has been low, variable, and in decline. 
These authors criticise Sachs for essentialising Darfur to rainfall - making the paper more of a 
critique of people who claim there is a hard link of climate change to conflict than an 
assessment of whether climate change and conflict really are connected in hard ways. This is 
a strong critique – there is a tendency in the debate on Darfur to mythologise Darfur as an 
archetypal ‘climate change conflict’, which overrides the political discussion of the conflict. 
The authors’ methodology is clear and they indicate the difficulty in establishing causality 
through a quantitative analysis which cannot take into account other key factors in the 
conflict. 
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Leroy, M. and Gebresenbet, F. (2011) ‘Climate Conflict in the Horn of Africa?’,  
Conflict Trends, Accord 
 
The authors analyse potential climate conflicts in the Horn of Africa and argue that there is 
no evidence to support popular claims of a climate war in Sudan. Moreover, they warn of the 
dangers of depoliticising political conflicts. While this is a nuanced argument there is no 
empirical evidence visible in the paper.   The authors mention that they have undertaken their 
own research but besides this comment it is not evident what research was done. Thus, the 
article reads more like a literature review. 
 
Mazo, J. (2009). ‘Chapter Four: Conflict, Instability and State Failure: The Climate 
Factor’.  The Adelphi Papers 49(409), pp87-118. 
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This paper explores the role of climate change on state weakness and failure. Though it 
claims to answer how representative the Darfur conflict is of how the changing climate may 
interact with other factors affecting conflict, it fails to do so and makes little reference to 
Darfur in the article. It appears to be a section of a larger volume, so, while not complete on 
its own, this may partially explain its utter failure to answer the question.  
This article interrogates the assumptions behind the links drawn between climate change, 
resource scarcity, and state failure and offers theoretical insight into the nature of these links. 
However, it assumes a set expected outcomes of climate change without justifying their use, 
exploring the socio-political factors that may alter them, or allowing for the potential that 
climate change could bring both negative AND positive changes. Despite its useful 
theoretical insight, this paper is a largely descriptive, hypothetical account of the future 
effects of climate change on future state failure and fragility rather than an examination of the 
role of climate change in past occurrences.  
This study contains no description of methodology and no data that could be considered local 
level. It draws on a substantial amount of secondary sources and statistics to demonstrate the 
general affects of climate change. Without access to its endnotes it is difficult to assess its 
evidence based, though it appears to be based predominantly in existing conflict and 
scientific literature.  
 
 
Meier, P., Bond, D., and Bond, J. (2007). ‘Environmental influences on pastoral conflict 
in the Horn of Africa’,  Political Geography, 26(6), 716-735. 
 
This study seeks to identify environmental indicators that may serve as harbingers of pastoral 
conflict/raids. It uses data collected by field monitors from the Inter- Governmental Authority 
on Development’s (IGAD) Conflict Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN) in 
the Karamoja cluster (border regions of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda). It finds that raids are 
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more likely when aggravating behavior and vegetation are high and reciprocal exchanges and 
peace initiatives are low. It shows that resource predation and looting may be important in 
sustaining raiding behaviour given the association between vegetation and raids. This article 
has transparent methodology and notes limitations to its conclusions, though not potential 
biases. 
 
 
Nordas, R. and Gleditsch,N. (2007). ‘Climate change and conflict’,  Political Geography 
26(6) 
 
This article is  a literature review of different perspectives connecting climate change and 
conflict. It is designed as an introduction to a series of articles and does not present its own 
empirical work or new theorization, though it notes a number of works that may be of interest 
to JSRP's analysis of these phenomenon that may not have come out in the literauture 
searches. 
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Obioha, E. ‘Climate Change , Population Drift and Violent Conflict over Land 
Resources in Northeastern Nigeria’,  Conflict 23(4), 311-324 
 
This article both uses and critically analyzes the Homer-Dixon/Malthusian link between 
climate change and conflict. It finds that resource scarcity leads to both Simple Scarcity and 
Group Identity conflics in the region, particularly among those who practice animal 
husbandry, which contributes to the indigeneity-based conflicts occuring throughout Nigeria. 
This article notes that it uses both existing data on conflict incidence as well as observational 
studies. It is unclear however what conclusions are drawn specifically from the observational 
studies, or how these studies were carried out and does not note biases/limitations. This 
article does provide an interesting typology of conflict in this region as well as a rich 
theoretical discussion. 
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Omolo, N. (2011). ‘Gender and climate change-induced conflict in pastoral communities 
: Case study of Turkana in north- western Kenya’, African Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 81-102. 
 
This article proceeds from the assumption that climate change is occuring, that it creates 
droughts and floods in northern Kenya. It argues that these changes are likely to increase the 
drivers of conflict in this area and increase the economic vulnerability of women. This article 
notes that pastoralist groups in this area have developed a complex set of coping strategies to 
deal with the changes and notes that mobility is an especially important component of this. It 
proceeds from the point that climate change increases resource competition among pastoral 
groups which in turn increases conflict, but does not account for what happens in times of 
abundance, such as floods or heavy rains which the author notes may also result in conflict. 
In making this claim this paper also fails to discuss scarcity/abundance debates. This paper 
provides a very good description of methodology and data collection that uses both survey 
and focus groups. This paper presents some interesting findings, but builds upon a shaky 
foundation as it fails to interrogate the larger assumptions linking climate change to conflict. 
It seems to assume a general relationship between these phenomena and makes jumps in 
logic that assume causal mechanisms without explaining or substantiating them or exploring 
the potential for reverse causality.  This article notes factors that can complicate conflict 
dynamics (ethnic divisions, human and food security, etc) but does not meaningfully 
incorporate them into its analysis. Policy and governance factors are also omitted. Its 
discussion on climate change and women's roles is also unnuanced, and seems to proceed 
from the same climate-conflict link to then assess vulnerabilities. 
 
Raleigh, C. and Urdal, H. (2007), ‘Climate change, environmental degradation and 
armed conflict’, Political Geography 26(6), 674-694. 
 
This study uses GIS data and small geographical units (rather than national averages) to 
assess the relationship between environmental change and conflict using the Uppsala/PRIO 
Coder:       DS 
Score data quality:     3.33 
Score quality analysis:    1.5 
Total score:      5 
 
Quantity of data/information used:  10%-50% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Qualitative, interview-based 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  No significant new data / information 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  No significant new analysis / theoretical 
insight 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Strongly disagree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Strongly disagree 
Underlying model used consistently  Disagree 
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dataset. It also included state-level GDP estimates and political attributes.  It finds that 
population growth and density are associated with increased risk of conflict, whereas land 
degredation and water scarcity have an very minor effect. Lower levels of GDP were the 
most important predictor of armed conflict. This article has transparent methodology and 
provides a number of new analyses of existing data. It its noteable for its inclusion of small 
geographical units, which give a more accurate picture of local-level conflict dynamics and 
allow the model to achieve greater predictive power. 
 
Raleigh, C. (2010), ‘Political Marginalization, Climate Change, and Conflict in African 
Sahel States’, International Studies Review 12(1), 69-86. 
 
This article explores the increased incidence of communal conflict resulting from increased 
vulnerability of certain groups due to climate change. It finds that the extent of political and 
economic marginalization/vulnerability is a critical component of overall vulnerability to the 
effects of climate change and the resulting emergence of conflict. This variable mediates the 
effect of climate change on conflict, and can be used as a way to predict where climate-
enduced conflict may occur. This article does use existing datasets but does not note their 
potential biases/limitations. Despite the use of these datasets, this article  relies heavily on 
existing literature to make its points. 
Coder:       DS 
Score data quality:     3 
Score quality analysis:    4 
Total score:      7 
 
Quantity of data/information used:  10%-50% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Quantitative; existing dataset 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  No significant new data / information 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  Considerable amount of new analysis / 
theoretical insight 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Strongly agree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Agree 
Underlying model used consistently  Agree 
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Reuveny, R. (2007), ‘Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict’, Political 
Geography 26(6), 656-673. 
 
This article argues that climate change will cause people in LDCs to migrate, and may cause 
conflict in receiving areas. It notes that this conflict occurs in the presence of resource 
competition, ethnic tension, distrust, and socio-economic/cultural fault lines. This model 
applies to general migration as well, which is accelerated by climate change. The article notes 
the importance of considering climate change in the context of LDCs with agriculturally-
based livelihoods and high frequencies of disasters. This article acknowledges that it does not 
find a causal link between climate change and conflict, and notes that its sample is likely to 
be too small to be generalisable.  The data used in this paper spans 80+ years and is limited to 
conflicts for which data is available, which fails to capture small scale incidents. In the 
absence of multivariate analysis it is difficult to see strong correlations. This paper's 
conceptualization of the factors affecting conflict as a result of environmentally based 
migration is interesting, though it is difficult to separate environmental push factors from 
other push factors. It is also an interesting overview of large instances of environmental 
migration and conflict from a wide range of countries. While it acknowledges changes in 
environmental patterns over time in its theoretical discussion, this paper does not discuss 
these changes in the data analysis section and focuses instead on specific instances of 
environmentally-induced migration rather than broader patterns. 
Coder:       DS 
Score data quality:     2.33 
Score quality analysis:    2.5 
Total score:      5 
 
Quantity of data/information used:  10%-50% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Quantitative; existing dataset 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  No significant new data / information 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  Some significant new analysis / 
theoretical insight 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Strongly agree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Strongly agree 
Underlying model used consistently  Strongly agree 
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Conservation Development Centre, International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, Saferworld (2009): ‘Climate change and conflict: Lessons from 
community conservancies in northern Kenya’ , CDC/IISD/Saferworld Report, 
November 2009 
 
The Saferworld report examines the relationship between climate change and natural resource 
scarcity induced conflict in northern Kenya. Based on their fieldwork, the authors claim that 
resource scarcity already has a detrimental impact on conflict between pastoralists and 
farmers which will increase with further change. They conclude, however, that climate 
change may have less of an impact on conflict risks if good local natural resource 
management systems are integrated well with a national resource strategy. The conclusions 
are based on field and desk-based research and linked to the broader literature. The research 
methodology, however, is not explained in detail. For example, which members of the local 
communities were interviewed remain unclear. 
Coder:       DS 
Score data quality:     2.66 
Score quality analysis:    3.5 
Total score:      6 
 
Quantity of data/information used:  10%-50% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Quantitative; gathering own data 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  Some new data / information 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  Some significant new analysis / 
theoretical insight 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Agree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Agree 
Underlying model used consistently  Strongly agree 
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Smith, D, Vivekananda, J (2007) ‘A Climate of Conflict: The Links between Climate 
Change, Peace and War’, International Alert: London 
 
This oft-cited report by International Alert argues that climate change and conflict pose a 
double-headed risk of either armed conflict (in 46 countries) or political instability (in 56 
countries). The authors do not link climate change and conflict directly but maintain that the 
'consequences of the consequences'  will lead to four key risks: political instability, economic 
weakness, food insecurity, and demographic changes (migration and urbanisation). Case 
studies on different countries are used throughout the report, however, it is not made clear on 
what evidence the case studies are based. Moreover, the uncertainties of climate change are 
not considered and despite the claims that no direct link between climate change and conflict 
is being considered the report makes very generalised and deterministic  statements  on the 
issue. Nevertheless, three of the twelve policy recommendations that the authors give are 
concerned with the need for further research. 
Coder:       AH 
Score data quality:     2 
Score quality analysis:    3.5 
Total score:      5.5 
 
Quantity of data/information used:  10%-50% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Qualitative, interview-based 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  Some new data / information 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  No significant new analysis / theoretical 
insight 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Strongly agree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Disagree 
Underlying model used consistently  Agree 
 61 
 
 
Smith, P. (2007). ‘Climate Change , Weak States and the " War on Terrorism" in South 
and Southeast Asia’,  Contemporary Southeast Asia 29(2), 264-285. 
 
This essay finds that while a clear link between climate change and terrorism cannot be 
established, an association between these activities is emerging and will continue to do so in 
the future. It focuses on Indonesia, the Philippines, and Bangladesh. The suggested 
mechanism is that climate change may create weak states, reduce state capacity, and create 
ungoverned spaces, which are easily exploitable by political extremists. This paper relies on 
existing literature to make its claims. It makes good points about the destabilizing impact of 
climate change and is a useful look at the general state of affairs in these countries,  but is 
unable to draw more than associational linkages. 
 
Coder:       AH 
Score data quality:      
Score quality analysis:     
Total score:       
 
Quantity of data/information used:  Less than 10% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Theoretical 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  Theoretical 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  Some significant new analysis / 
theoretical insight 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Agree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Disagree 
Underlying model used consistently  Agree 
Coder:       DS 
Score data quality:      
Score quality analysis:     
Total score:       
 
Quantity of data/information used:  Less than 10% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Theoretical 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  Theoretical 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  Some significant new analysis / 
theoretical insight 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Disagree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Disagree 
Underlying model used consistently  Disagree 
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Temestgen, A. (2010). ‘Climate Change to Conflict: lessons from southern Ethiopia and 
northern Kenya’,  Fafo Report 2010 (09) 
 
This paper shows that environmental deterioration coupled with other 
social/political/economic factors "tremendously increases" the likelihood of conflict in the 
Horn of Africa. It focuses on pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya and Southern 
Ethiopia, and notes that traditional institutions (which serve as coping mechanisms in times 
of environmental scarcity) are weakened due to policies of ethnic federalism, which disrupt 
reciprocal grazing arrangements. This weakening in turn increases the likelihood of 
violence/cattle raiding in pastoralist communities. This paper is interesting for its use of 
qualitative methods and uses grey literature and qualitative fieldwork. It employs a double 
exposure conceptual framework that uses climate and policy environment as explanatory 
variables. This study provides extensive information on the study area, but limited 
information on the fieldwork design/methodology/limitations, other than that it was 
interview-based. It notes that the conclusions of this study can be applied throughout the 
continent, but does not justify this claim or account for differing policy environments or 
traditional institutional arrangements. 
 
Theisen, O. (2008). ‘Blood and Soil? Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict 
Revisited’, Journal of Peace Research 45(6), 801-818. 
 
This article replicates the Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) study that found the strongest link to 
date between renewable resource scarcity and civil conflict, and found little support for this 
purported link. It concludes that poverty and dysfunctional institutions are robustly related to 
conflict. This paper uses the dataset from the original 1998 study as well as other existing 
data sets, but does not discuss the limitations of this data. It does however note possible 
limitations of using national aggregate data in later modeling. It notes that causality cannot be 
established, though cites the feeback mechanism between conflict and environmental 
degradation. This article contradicts many of the common assumptions behind prominent 
Coder:       DS 
Score data quality:     3 
Score quality analysis:    3.5 
Total score:      6.5 
 
Quantity of data/information used:  10%-50% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Qualitative, interview-based 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  Some new data / information 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  Some significant new analysis / 
theoretical insight 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Strongly agree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Agree 
Underlying model used consistently  Agree 
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theoretical views, and provides rigorous criticism of their models, and notes the need for a 
definition of degradation. 
 
Tol, R. and Wagner, S. (2008). ‘Climate Change and Violent Conflict in Europe over the 
Last Millennium’, FNU Working Paper 154. 
 
This article finds that conflict in Europe over the last thousand years has been more intense 
during colder periods, which confirms the conclusions of Zhang et al. (2006) that colder 
periods tend to be more violent, and that climate change may lead to reduced violence 
conflict in Europe. It notes that patterns of conflict related to temperature were more intense 
in medieval than modern times. It does note the possible reversal of this relationship in the 
tropics, however. It uses existing datasets and acknowledges their shortcomings, and also 
notes the limitations of the statistical analysis methods used. The conclusions of this paper 
are interesting and are arrived at through transparent methodology, though reverse causality 
and intervening variables are not noted. Its conclusions are however limited to Europe and 
Northern latitudes. 
Coder:       DS 
Score data quality:     2.66 
Score quality analysis:    3.5 
Total score:      6 
 
Quantity of data/information used:  10%-50% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Quantitative; existing dataset 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  Some new data / information 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  Considerable amount of new analysis / 
theoretical insight 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Strongly agree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Strongly agree 
Underlying model used consistently  Strongly agree 
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Verhoeven, H., 2011. ‘Climate Change , Conflict and Development in Sudan : Global 
Neo-Malthusian Narratives and Local Power’,  Development and Change, 42(3), p.679-
707 
 
Verhoeven argues that neo-Malthusian narratives of climate conflict in Darfur are 
theoretically and empirically problematic. According to Verhoeven,  neo-Malthusians take a 
global outlook on the climate and security link and thus prioritise state defense over human 
security. Moreover, this kind of narrative is not only used by Western powers but also by 
African elites who use it to justify dam-building and agricultual projects that marginalise 
vulnerable groups. This is an extremely critical and well-argued article that unfortuantely 
lacks empirical evidence. The author does not stop at questioning the climate security 
discourse but also shows problems with the definitions of violence and conflict themselves. 
 
Coder:       DS 
Score data quality:     3.66 
Score quality analysis:    3 
Total score:      6.5 
 
Quantity of data/information used:  More than 50% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Quantitative; existing dataset 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  Some new data / information 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  Some significant new analysis / 
theoretical insight 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Strongly agree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Strongly agree 
Underlying model used consistently  Strongly agree 
Coder:       AH 
Score data quality:      
Score quality analysis:     
Total score:       
 
Quantity of data/information used:  Less than 10% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Theoretical 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  Theoretical 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  Some significant new analysis / 
theoretical insight 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Strongly agree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Strongly agree 
Underlying model used consistently  Strongly agree 
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Warner, K., Hamza, M., Oliver-Smith, A., Renaud, F., and Julca, A. (2009). ‘Climate 
change, environmental degradation and migration’,  Natural Hazards 55(3), 689-715. 
 
This paper focuses largely on environmentally induced migration and only tangentially 
touches on conflict. It uses one quotation to note the relationship between water shortage and 
conflict, but makes no other connection. I makes this note as part of its larger discussion on 
factors (including conflict) of migration. This article presents significant other information on 
environmental causes of migration, but it has been graded on the extent to which it explores 
the environment-conflict relationship. 
 
 
 
Witensburg, K. and Adano, W. (2009). ‘Of Rain and Raids: Violent Livestock Raiding 
in Northern Kenya’, Civil Wars 11(4), 514-538. 
 
This article explores whether violent livestock raiding in Northern Kenya shows any 
seasonality by creating its own dataset and using archival material and interviews. It notes the 
assumption that conflict will be driven by resource scarcity and competition, but finds that 
raiding occurs more often in wet than dry years. This disproves the assumption, but implies 
the fluctuations of climate change will impact raiding. It notes the lack of a statistical 
relationship between conflict and resource scarcity, but cites the importance of human agency 
in conflict, and the importance of opportunity in determining incidence of raids and that raids 
are used a way to express resentment. It uses "violent deaths" as a proxy for conflict but 
doesn’t note the shortfalls of this approach or explore the potential problems of assuming this 
link. This study notes some limitations of the data used, but does not touch on biases in 
assessment or limitations internal/external validity of its conclusions. 
Coder:       DS 
Score data quality:      
Score quality analysis:     
Total score:       
 
Quantity of data/information used:  Less than 10% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Theoretical 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  Theoretical 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  NA 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Strongly disagree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Strongly disagree 
Underlying model used consistently  Strongly disagree 
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Coder:       DS 
Score data quality:     3.33 
Score quality analysis:    2 
Total score:      5.5 
 
Quantity of data/information used:  More than 50% empirical information 
Type(s) of data/information used:   
Quantitative; gathering own data 
 
How insightful in terms of data/information?  Some new data / information 
How insightful in terms of analysis/theory?  Considerable amount of new analysis / 
theoretical insight 
 
Clear underlying model of conflict  Strongly agree  
Underlying model reviewed critically  Agree 
Underlying model used consistently  Agree 
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Appendix 2:  Grading Form 
Evidence Paper Grading Form 
     
                  
Full citation:             
Initials grader:             
                  
1. Please assess the amount of evidence the work contains (enter a '1' to select):     
                  
Roughly how much of the work being assessed presents 
empirical data/information– rather than theory, hypotheses, 
review of other literature etc.? 
50% or more   
between 10% and 50%   
10% or less   
  
2. Please select main category/ies of empirical 
data/information the work uses (enter a '1' to 
select): 
A. Quantitative, using existing dataset   
B. Quantitative, gathering own data   
        C. Qualitative, interview based   
        
D. Qualitative, ethnographic / participatory 
observation   
        E. Other primary sources   
                  
3. Please answer the following questions, for selected category/ies only:     
  
                
A. Quantitative, using existing dataset (enter a '1' to select)     
        
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Agree  
Strongly 
agree Score 
Indicators used accurately capture the phenomenon the 
author aims to draw conclusions about (proxies are 
appropriate, measures are sensitive to changes on the 
ground).            
The process of compiling the data is transparent: the author 
provides the source of his data and describes how data is 
collected by a third party.           
Potential biases in the data are acknowledged: data not 
missing at random, limited number of observations, 
measurement error, etc.            
The paper has a sound identification strategy: the author 
shows that the observed relationship indicates a causal 
relationship and that it is not due to reversed causality, 
non-random allocation of 'treatment', intervening third 
(omitted) variables, etc. The author acknowledges 
limitations and provides robusteness checks.             
Conclusions are supported by the data. Limitations to the 
internal validity (do conclusions apply to case(s) 
investigated?)  and external validity (do conclusions apply 
to cases other than those studied?) are discussed.            
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B. Quantitative, compiling own dataset (enter a '1' to select)     
      
  
 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Agree  
Strongly 
agree Score 
Method of data collection is transparent and clear.           
Data collected is representative of the wider population the 
research question implies: participants are selected in some 
systematic way. Nonresponse is limited.            
Potential biases in the data are limited/acknowledged: 
interviewer bias (respondent influenced by characteristics 
of interviewer), strategic bias (respondent provides 
inaccurate answers with some personal gain in mind), 
recall bias.           
The paper has a sound identification strategy: the author 
shows that the observed relationship indicates a causal 
relationship and that it is not due to reversed causality, 
non-random allocation of 'treatment', intervening third 
(omitted) variables, etc. The author acknowledges 
limitations and provides robusteness checks.             
Conclusions are supported by the data. Limitations to the 
internal validity (do conclusions apply to case(s) 
investigated?)  and external validity (do conclusions apply 
to cases other than those studied?) are discussed.            
                
  
C. Qualitative, interview based (enter a '1' to select)     
        
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Agree  
Strongly 
agree Score 
Information collected is adequately representative of the 
population / group the research aims to draw conclusions 
about           
The method of interviewing is clear, including the time 
frame of interviews, number of interviewees.           
Potential interview biases are limited/acknowledged: 
interviewer bias (respondent influenced by characteristics 
of interviewer), strategic bias (respondent provides 
inaccurate answers with some personal gain in mind), 
recall bias.            
Conclusions drawn are supported by the interviews; 
findings show that a substantial share of the interviews 
supports the conclusion(s).             
The analysis is contextualized in a broader literature / 
history. Generalizability of the conclusion(s) is considered.           
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D. Qualitative, ethnographic / participatory observation (enter a '1' to select)     
        
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Agree  
Strongly 
agree Score 
Information collected is adequately representative of the 
population / group the research aims to draw conclusions 
about           
Potential biases in the collection of information are limited. 
Efforts to triangulate information are made.            
Information is richly textured; nuanced and detailed 
information about local level experiences is included. 
Information is not limited to a handful of quotes.            
Conclusions drawn are supported by the observations 
made. Findings show that a substantial share of 
observations supports the conclusion(s).           
The analysis is contextualized in a broader literature / 
history. The broader relevance of the conclusion is 
considered.           
                  
E. Other primary sources (i.e. archives, government documents, reports, photographs)   
        
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Agree  
Strongly 
agree Score 
Information collected is adequately representative of the 
population / group the research aims to draw conclusions 
about           
Potential biases in the collection of information are limited. 
Efforts to triangulate information are made.            
Method of data collection is transparent and clear.           
Conclusions drawn are supported by the information 
collected. Findings show that a substantial share of 
information collected supports the conclusion(s).           
The analysis is contextualized in a broader literature / 
history. The broader relevance of the conclusion is 
considered.           
                  
        
TOTAL SCORE QUALITY DATA / 
INFO   
        TOTAL SCORE QUALITY ANALYSIS   
        TOTAL SCORE   
        TOTAL SCORE MENDELEY   
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4. Please assess the overall quality of the work (enter a '1' to select)     
                  
4.1     In comparison to other literature you have reviewed, 
how insightful do you consider this work to be in terms of 
data/information? 
No significant new data/information 
presented   
Some new data/information presented   
A considerable amount of new 
data/information presented   
  
4.2      In comparison to other literature you have reviewed, 
how insightful do you consider this work to be in terms of 
analysis presented? 
No significant new analysis or theoretical 
insight.   
Some new analysis or theoretical insight   
A considerable amount of insightful 
analysis or theoretical insight   
  
5. Please give  a 1-3 line summary of the main 
argument of the work and a 1-3 line annotation 
(assessment of the quality of the work)   
                  
Completeness check:  Please answer question 1 
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Appendix 3: List of Databases searched 
 
The searches were done using the following staged approach as suggested by the LSE 
Library.   Their advice begins with three general abstracting and indexing databases, 
followed by a number of specialist databases, then finally some freely available and niche 
resources. 
 
Stage one: general abstracting & indexing databases 
The following resources are quality-controlled, general abstracting & indexing databases. 
They include records from large but limited sets of peer-reviewed journal literature. Using 
these resources will ensure that an extensive set of peer-reviewed journal literature is 
searched. 
● Scopus https://catalogue.lse.ac.uk/Record/1252795 
● ISI Web of Knowledge https://catalogue.lse.ac.uk/Record/1149290 
● IBSS https://catalogue.lse.ac.uk/Record/1149716 
 
Stage two: subject specialist databases 
The following resources are subject-specific abstracting & indexing databases, which 
provide focussed coverage of the subjects in question. They can be utilised to gap-fill after 
searches with the databases in stage one have been used. 
 
● ELDIS (https://catalogue.lse.ac.uk/Record/1152004) 
● ENDS (https://catalogue.lse.ac.uk/Record/663683) 
● Environmental impact from climate change to biodiversity loss: documenting man’s 
impact (https://catalogue.lse.ac.uk/Record/1263831) 
● GreenFILE (https://catalogue.lse.ac.uk/Record/1151905) 
Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO) https://catalogue.lse.ac.uk/Record/648529. It 
uses a Google search engine which is difficult to search in a structured manner, so some 
experimentation may be required. 
 
A specific list of climate focused journals is available here 
http://zw4gk5cr3l.search.serialssolutions.com/?V=1.0&N=100&L=ZW4GK5CR3L&S=T_W_A
&C=climate 
 
Stage three: web-based, free to access services 
The following resources are freely available scholarly literature search engines. They 
examine much of the material covered by the databases above, but also have the advantage 
of including “grey” literature, such as working papers, NGO/ IGO material, blog content etc. 
Google Scholar is the leading product in this area, but it is recommended that at least one 
other resource be used to guard against potential Google bias. 
 
● Google Scholar http://scholar.google.co.uk/ (searches across scholarly literature as 
defined by Google; selection and ranking are both opaque) 
● Scirus http://www.scirus.com/ (emphasis is on scientific literature, but contains 
information on all scholarly disciplines) 
● RefSeek http://www.refseek.com/ (new product; searches across IGO and NGO 
websites, as well as academic sites for scholarly literature, broadly defined) 
● OAISTER http://oaister.worldcat.org/ (search engine which searches across institutional 
repositories. Particularly useful for working papers & other informal literature, can also 
throw up information from non-Western sources. Also picks up book chapters) 
There are also some free resources here (there are only 7): http://www.delicious.com/ 
LSELibrary/climatechange 
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Stage four: other resources 
These resources fulfil a variety of needs for searching for specialised types of information. 
As with stage 2, the resources can be used selectively. They may also be considered to be 
outside the scope of the literature review (e.g. gateways for regional and governmental 
information). 
 
For your search topic, I would recommend having a look at books and theses and 
dissertations, if time allows; the other sources are likely to be less important. 
Searching for books. 
 
● Worldcat http://www.worldcat.org/ (federated catalogue of worldwide library catalogues) 
Searching for theses and dissertations. 
● Proquest dissertations and theses https://catalogue.lse.ac.uk/Record/1149203 (indexing 
& abstracting service for international theses) 
● DART Europe http://www.dart-europe.eu/ (federated search tool to search across 
European repositories of PhD theses) 
● Database of African Theses and Dissertations (DATAD) http://www.aau.org/datad/| 
Searching for blog content: 
● Technorati http://technorati.com/ 
● Bloglines: http://www.bloglines.com/ 
Searching for press and news material: 
● Nexis https://catalogue.lse.ac.uk/Record/1149745 (full text versions of a large number of 
Major international, national and local newspapers) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
